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Introduction
Any visitor to Paris today will probably pass through the Bir Hakeim metro stop,
the station closest to the Eiffel Tower. It takes its name from the victory of the Free
French Forces in Libya over German General Erwin Rommel’s joint Italian-German
forces. With so few triumphs to celebrate, this commemoration of a World War Two
victory is nearly unique in France. The Second World War is not a topic that most
French people want to discuss. Far better to talk about the Great War and French
heroism at Verdun. The Second World War is too complicated and too ambiguous to be
a source of national pride. But nevertheless it is an unavoidable part of France’s history,
with a legacy contemporaries and modern day scholars alike have been forced to contend
with. This legacy has given rise to myths and much debate.1 Some have tried to paint the
occupation as igniting a heroic outpouring of patriotism, while others have seen
cowardice and culpability. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. The defeat France
suffered in May and June 1940, though cataclysmic and shocking to contemporaries, is
far less interesting than its aftermath.

In four years of foreign occupation, France

suffered deprivation and fear on a nationwide scale, a fate which molded her present and
changed her future.
Historical Context
When Germany launched Case Yellow against Western Europe on May 10, 1940,
it was not without warning signs. Throughout the 1930’s Adolf Hitler’s Germany had
been rearming and acting in open defiance of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which had
been designed to curb its power and potential aggression. For a myriad of reasons (that
1
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have been the study of many books), France was ill-prepared to meet this threat, in spite
of the mounting warning sings. And so, in under two months, France fell to the German
army.
Eight months prior, the opening guns of World War Two had been sounded. On
September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, decimating Europe’s uneasy peace.
Within days both Great Britain and France had rushed to Poland’s defense, declaring war
on Germany. Despite their apparent eagerness to enter the fray, however, both nations
waited on Germany’s next move in what became known as the phony war, or le drôle de
guerre.
Case Yellow abruptly ended this period of expectant inactivity. Bypassing the
Maginot Line that stretched along France’s borders from Switzerland to Luxembourg, the
Germans instead invaded through the north, entering neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands, as well as France’s Ardennes Forest. Within ten days German forces
reached the Atlantic Coast, splitting the Allied forces. The British Expeditionary Force
and members of the French army were evacuated at Dunkirk onto waiting British war
ships in an attempt to salvage what remained of the beaten armies, to fight another day.
On June 11, Paris was declared an open city and three days later the German army
entered the French capital. The world watched with horror as the storied French military
crumbled in the span of six weeks under the Nazi onslaught.
Thousands of civilians from northern and eastern France fled in the face of
invasion, inundating the southern provinces with refugees and beginning the war years
with a significant stress on resources, including food, petrol, and even impacting the

2

conditions of the roads.2 The French called this mass migration l’exode, and it included
civilians from all social classes.3 Those who remained in Paris described the city as
empty: shops closed, streets deserted, trains crowded beyond capacity and running
constantly to evacuate as many civilians as possible.4

For most people, no real

destination existed – anywhere but here, anywhere to be safe from the army chomping at
their heels. The exode was a dramatic, but temporary, demographic shift. Still, it
foreshadowed the troubled times to come, revealing the inadequacy of French trade
routes and supply lines when placed under pressure, and the inability of the government
to calm the nation in a time of chaos.
Overpowered by the superiority of German forces, the French sued for an
armistice, which was reached on June 22. Three days later, France officially surrendered.
Under the armistice terms, all France was to be disarmed. In addition, the country was
divided into zones. Alsace and Moselle, long a source of Germano-French tensions, were
annexed into the Third Reich and cultural vestiges such as speaking French or wearing
berets were outlawed.5 Alsaciens and inhabitants of the Moselle who had fled with the
exode were only permitted to return home if they could prove they were not of Jewish
descent, and that their families had been in residence prior to 1918.6 The Nord Pas de
Calais was closed off from the rest of France and governed from Belgium as part of a

2
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German-administered military zone.7 This stopped any movement in or out, isolating it
from neighboring regions. The north and east, including Paris and extending down along
the Atlantic Coast, were occupied, placed directly under German control and answering
ultimately to Berlin.
The Occupied Zone ended at the demarcation line, which divided it from the Free
Zone to the south. The demarcation line seems somewhat arbitrary – it did not follow
any natural landmarks, and ran haphazardly across departmental lines, even splitting
some towns in two.8 What at first glance appears illogical, though, in fact reflects the
enormous power imbalance between France and Germany in 1940. Germany held the
French capital, the richest agricultural lands and the majority of French industry. They
controlled access to the English Channel and the Atlantic coast.

Perhaps most

importantly though, stopping short of a full territorial occupation allowed the Germans to
preserve their own resources. Maintaining French bureaucracy spared German personnel
for more valuable tasks in Berlin and on the Eastern Front. Additionally, by keeping the
French administration in place and working with them through official channels, the
Germans gave the French government a vested interest in collaboration. And, should the
need arise, German forces felt comfortable in the knowledge that occupying the
remainder of the country would pose little challenge.
France’s government had been on the run since the beginning of May 1940. From
Paris, it bounced from Tours to Bordeaux, staying a step ahead of both l’exode and the
German offensive. But geographic displacement was nothing compared to the turmoil
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within the French government.

Prime minister Paul Reynaud was facing mounting

dissension and resigned on June 16. His replacement was Marshall Philippe Pétain, the
great hero of World War I, revered by the whole nation. Pétain’s government favored an
“honorable” peace with Germany and immediately sought a cease-fire.9 After signing an
armistice with Germany, the new government headquartered itself in Vichy, a spa town
in the Auvergne, located some distance south of the demarcation line.
The choice of Vichy is another decision that feels arbitrary, however it too can be
explained. Essentially, Vichy was secure. It was removed from the politics, often
socialist, of larger southern towns like Marseille or Toulouse.10 It was a safe distance
from the coast, the demarcation line, and the Swiss border so the Germans felt secure. Its
newness provided a means for the French government to start over. Under Pétain, the
Third Republic, which had existed since the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, was dissolved
and replaced by the French State, or l’Etat Français. Unofficially, it became known as
Vichy, adopting the name of its chosen location, the name it has been known by ever
since.
Vichy’s exact status has been the subject of serious debate. Some have called it a
puppet state, while others insist on its autonomy.11 Even more so in retrospect, Vichy has
taken on a divisive role, as the responsibility of the French in Occupied France has been
subject to reassessment by historians.

Ultimate authority derived from Berlin and

policies were only enacted when they did not contradict existing German policies. Vichy
was internationally recognized by contemporaries, and even had a United States embassy
9
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in the first years of the war.12 It had its own bureaucracy, and particularly in the Free
Zone was active in promulgating policies and seeking autonomy. However, this pursuit
of autonomy could be a doubled-edged sword.

Often in attempting to prove their

effectiveness and gain more power, French administration and police found themselves
performing the German’s dirty work under the guise of independent action.13 The best
example of this is the role of the French police in rounding up the country’s Jewish
population – of the seven internment camps in France, six were run by the French, who
also played an active role in marginalizing and eventually arresting and deporting Jews,
especially between 1940-1943.14
Perhaps the greatest condemnation of Vichy comes from its active espousal and
pursuit of collaboration.15 Working with German authorities has been termed the “shield
theory” by many apologists and by Vichy authorities themselves when they stood trial for
treason following Liberation.16

Ostensibly, Vichy created a safeguard between the

Germans and the French population at large, and Vichy’s attempts at collaboration
mitigated national suffering and prevented “Polandization.”17 It seems clear though, that
collaboration implied slightly more than this defense mechanism – at its worst, it caused
Vichy to actively aid and even promote rounding up France’s Jewish population. In fact
the decision to deport Jewish children along with adults came from a top Vichy minister,
12
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purportedly to “keep families together.”18 Clearly Vichy shared more than a little of the
responsibility.
Thesis
The chaos of World War Two provided the background and impetus for the
events in France between 1940 and 1944. Though the war may have been as distant as
Russia or the Pacific Ocean, its impact reverberated into the heart of France and dictated
the course of the occupation, determining the way that French civilians experienced the
war. It is easy to lose sight of these civilians amidst the drama of earth-changing political
and military events. The scale of life, however, does not lessen the importance of the
French civilian’s experience.
Journals and other contemporary sources are the best means of piecing together
the civilian experience in Occupied France. They come from rural and urban locations
throughout the country, presenting a kaleidoscope of personalities and experiences. In
search of the average civilian experience, though, this diversity is problematic. Not
surprisingly, there is no discernible single experience that ran throughout all of France
and all of its citizens. Hunger, deprivation, and fear may have been present everywhere,
but in varying degrees that depended on a number of factors.
One of these factors was population size. A larger native population denoted a
larger importance to any town or city, and it was in France’s densely populated areas
where the majority of Germans lived and worked. As cultural and administrative centers,
cities naturally attracted the occupying power, which was looking to work with and
manipulate these institutions. A highly populated area also provided the critical mass of

18
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people needed for enterprises such as the black market or collaboration or resistance to
succeed.
There were some areas that drew the attention of the German occupiers, not
because of their significance as cultural or administrative centers, but because of their
strategic locations.

The best examples of this, where geography became a crucial

determinant of occupation policy, are France’s coastal areas. Considered vulnerable to
seaborne attack, the Germans stretched the demarcation line to include the entire Channel
and Atlantic Coasts.19 Though important towns dotted the coastline, most notably Nantes
and Bordeaux, the main motivation for extending the occupation into these areas was not
to control these cities, but to control the coast. In so doing, Germany also controlled
what (and who) passed into and out of France by water. Eventually, decrees were even
passed demanding that civilians move away from the vulnerable coastline, transforming it
into a military zone.20 Normandy, along France’s Channel coast, was the most important
region to have its occupation experience dictated by geography. Judged to be a likely
point for Allied landings, the Germans were careful to man the Norman coast from the
outset of the war, long before such a threat was likely.21
Though never a hard and fast rule, belonging to the right social class could
usually ease many of the hardships of occupation, even in cities or along the tactically
important coast. Wealth or connections were the most effective means of lessening the
19
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day-to-day difficulties of the occupation, and according to one contemporary observer,
for many Frenchmen living through the occupation, their lifestyle was as imbued as the
Rights of Man – those accustomed to luxury resorted to any means to maintain it.22
Though social factors were clearly important, material factors were the greatest
determinants of the French civilian’s experience of the occupation. Of material factors,
by far the most important was economic – it virtually defined the experience of most
French citizens.

Most memories of the war revolve around various aspects of the

economic situation: waiting in endless queues to buy food, ration coupons in hand;
bicycling into the countryside in search of provisions when they failed to materialize at
markets in town; developing substitutes to replace missing necessities; hiding signs of
wealth to avoid requisitioning or denunciation. Scarcity and availability provided the
undertones for the occupation, nationwide.23 With only two months of active war and
four years of passive occupation, it is no surprise that economic realities reigned supreme
as the greatest burden of the occupation period.
Analyzing the occupation from both a rural and urban perspective illuminates the
similarities and differences between the two, based on each of the factors described above
– geography, population density, social class, material scarcity and availability – as well
as many others.

The main difference between rural and urban occupation was one of

degrees. Urban areas were most often the epicenter of the German presence, causing
these populations to endure the most friction between the power of the occupier, and the
forced lot of the occupied. By contrast, most towns and villages only saw German troops
at the beginning and end of the war, when they were on the move. Cities were also at an
22
23
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economic disadvantage. Often long distances from points of agricultural production, they
were dependent on trade to supply their markets.

When trade routes shrank or

occasionally collapsed, urban populations were the first to be beset by hunger and
scarcity. Rural populations, on the other hand, gained increasing economic power during
the war. Their proximity to agricultural production, even if they themselves were not
involved in production, gave them specialized access to supplies.
The greatest similarity that urban and rural France shared was the plain fact that
both were occupied. While certain factors could mitigate the effects of occupation, the
occupation itself remained in place.

That meant the countrywide imposition of a

controlled economy, German administrators and soldiers, and subjugation to a hostile
foreign power. Through an examination of the social and material factors that defined
the occupation, we can come closer to understanding the intricacies of daily life in
Occupied France, as well as the legacy it left behind.
Examining urban and rural experiences in conjunction using the common factors
that determined the course of the occupation in each allows us to come closer to
ultimately defining the average experience of the individual civilians who lived in
Occupied France. Or rather, it allows us to find several average experiences, accounting
for differences throughout France. Understanding the daily lives of civilians in one area
helps illuminate circumstances in another, ultimately illuminating the nationwide
consequences of the occupation, as experienced by ordinary French citizens.

10

Ch 1. The Urban Experience of Occupation
Introduction
On June 14, 1940, the day the German army entered Paris, sixteen Parisians killed
themselves.24

It is impossible to determine how many of these were the result of

invasion. It can be said, though, that suicide historically had a decidedly republican
flavor in France, in the style of ancient Rome, that would have been directly in opposition
to Nazi totalitarianism.25 So began the German occupation of France’s northern cities.
The German presence hit the urban areas of the Occupied Zone hard – Paris, Tours,
Bordeaux, Dijon, to name a few. The cities were subject to a new controlled economy
and rationing system. Their resultant effects metamorphisized the local economy. A
heavy German administrative and military presence forced constant contact between the
two populations. This contact forced the difficult question of how to navigate occupation
– pressure to collaborate or resist met pressure to simply see the occupation safely
through. Urban society in Occupied France between 1940-1944 was markedly different
than what came both before and after.
As of 1940, Paris alone played host to some 40,000 Germans.26 They held both
administrative and military positions, but, regardless of their official capacity, they
radically changed the demography and the environment of the city. Though Paris, which
served as headquarters of the Occupation, had the highest concentration of Germans
anywhere in France, other cities were subject to similar occupations resulting in similar
changes.

24
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The changes wrought by the occupation seem obvious, but in fact they were very
complex and had extended consequences, like a societal ripple effect. The first, and
probably the most important, step the Germans took was to transform French industrial
and agricultural production into a controlled economy, safeguarded by a system of
rationing.

“The German economy required French material resources, agricultural

products and industrial goods.

German industry needed French manpower for its

factories and the military needed it for its construction projects on the Atlantic Coast.”27
This spurred inflation and led to the development of several concentric black markets,
supplying the goods unavailable through the official market with varying degrees of price
extortion. Wage controls compounded these problems, in what was effectively a crisis
economy: a supplier’s market built on scarcity and disproportionately high demand.
The heavy German presence in urban centers opened the thorny question of how
to proceed: to resist, to collaborate, or to look for a middle path. Varying degrees of
economic collaboration existed in cities, as did multiple forms and interpretations of
resistance.

Defining collaboration and resistance became extremely difficult, most

notably in the instances of romantic or sexual relationships between French women and
German soldiers, better known as horizontal collaboration. Most French citizens fell
firmly in neither of the two camps, collaborator or resistor, and instead sought simply to
navigate through a changing society, and outlast the Occupation in peace.
German occupation in urban areas is best seen through the eyes of the people that
experienced it firsthand. Alfred Fabre-Luce lived in Paris during the Occupation and
recorded his observations in a journal.

The journal begins in 1939 as the French

27
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anticipate German attack and continues through Liberation, in 1944. Prior to the war
Fabre-Luce was employed as a writer, working in fiction, biographies, histories and
essays. During the war, though, he felt compelled to document instead his own changing
world. His journal is highly critical of contemporary society and devotes particular
attention to the prices and availability of food, which he sees as reflective of the
occupation as a whole.28
Fabre-Luce’s contemporary, Henri Drouot, lived in Dijon, the provincial capital
of Burgundy. He began a journal to document the Occupation after returning from the
defeated Western Front in late August 1940, where he had served as a reservist.29 He
continued writing until September 1944, when the Allied armies liberated Dijon. Trained
as a historian, specializing in the 16th century of his native Burgundy, Drouot turned his
analytical eye to the events around him. While personal and familial details have been
deleted from his journal by the publishers, it still retains the bulk of his observations.30
He cautions his readers in an introduction that his writing reflects perception much more
than reality. Nevertheless, his diary provides frequent reports on prices and availability
in the marketplace, war news, and local events and rumors surrounding the German
occupiers.
Together, the two men present similar pictures – of urban populations dominated
by insecurity and preoccupied with their own day-to-day survival. Neither of the men
makes mention of participating in any form of resistance or collaboration, but seem to
walk a middle road, almost as conscientious objectors to the entire affair. Their shared
28
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preoccupation with food availability and prices is extremely telling as to the prevailing
atmosphere within France. According to historian Richard Vinen, “The French talked
about food obsessively.”31 Indeed, while occupation obviously had large social and
political impacts, its biggest effects, and certainly the primary concern of contemporaries,
seem to have been economic. Historians, though acknowledging this, have tended to
focus on other aspects of urban occupation – the arts, intellectuals, and especially
collaboration and resistance. Recently, there has been a move towards examining what
are perhaps the more mundane aspects of urban occupation – price controls, the black
market, everyday Franco-German interactions, etc. This chapter follows in that vein, and
attempts to define the average French citizen’s experience of urban life under Nazi
Occupation.
Economic Conditions
The actual Occupation disrupted the economic order of France significantly more
than invasion had in May and June 1940. The invasion drew farmers and workers out of
the economic sector and into the armed forces, but most of these – with the exception of
prisoners of war of whom there were some 1.5 million, no small loss to the nation’s
economy – returned to their civilian lives within days of the armistice. 32 Occupation, by
contrast, was built around the idea that France should help Germany. This help took
many forms but by far the most tangible, and arguably the most important, was the
requisitioning of goods.

Known as the ravitaillement, this requisition necessitated

German control over production and supply, to ensure that the desired goods were
produced and sent back to the Reich. In order to ensure this management, the Nazi
31
32
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occupiers introduced a controlled economy in Occupied France. One of its key features
was rationing.
Rationing was essential to the effective operation of a combined Franco-German
economy. It regulated virtually all consumer goods, including clothing, tobacco, and
soap. Most importantly, though, it controlled food. Cheese, eggs, meat, milk, butter,
fats, oil, bread, wine, potatoes, fish – all were controlled by rationing.

33

Beginning in

August 1940, each citizen registered with their local suppliers – butchers, bakers, etc.
This registration was then noted on a citywide level and ration cards were made available
periodically, usually on a monthly basis, in the mairie, or town hall. 34 A ration card
determined how much of a type of food – in pounds of meat, for example – a person was
allotted each week. The Germans were not interested in needlessly antagonizing the
French, so food allotments were not intended to starve the local population. Nonetheless,
hunger has been pointed to as perhaps the predominant feature of the Occupation. 35
Rationing was not conducted uniformly, but rather by breaking the population
into subsections, based on age, gender and other needs. Group E included children under
age 3. J1 encompassed children ages 3-6, J2 children 6-13, and J3 ages 13-21. The
majority of adults were in group A, ages 21-70 with no special circumstances. T, from
the French travail, meaning work, covered adults ages 21-70 performing heavy manual
labor. Group C – for cultivateur, or farmer – referred to agricultural workers, whose
allotments were often smaller as they were assumed to have ready access to additional
food sources, by virtue of their labor. Adults over 70 were in group V, for vieux,
33
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meaning old. 36 Special categories also existed for pregnant or nursing mothers. These
divisions existed to meet special needs within the population, for example by providing
extra milk for children, or giving larger portions to those performing valuable manual
labor.

Despite these attempts at specialization, the rationing system almost always

represented a dramatic drop in caloric intake – prior to the war an average adult
consumed approximately 2500 calories a day, but this had dropped to between 1200-1500
by the end of the occupation in 1944.37
Obviously rationing could not meet demand.

So, French citizens turned to

alternative, extralegal means to procure the goods they needed. An extensive black
market developed and flourished in answer to this pervasive need. The black market
forged a link between the countryside and cities during the war, and it is difficult to
examine one side in isolation. The countryside played the crucial role of supplier,
supplementing the diet of town and city dwellers throughout the nation. This took place
in a number of ways, and there were several concentric black markets. The smallest
circle involved only immediate family and friends.

This often led to urbanites

rediscovering country cousins who could provide them with much needed packages of
food. These packages were known as colis familiaux. In 1942 alone, 13.5 million were
mailed throughout France.38 Often this smaller market, sometimes called the marche
amical, was based on barter economics, or even in some cases on the promise of future
payment.

36
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The black market grew wider and wider outward from this family circle. The
bigger the market, the higher the price. The government-set price of butter in 1942 was
43 francs a kilo. On the marche amical it sold for 69 francs, and on the black market for
107 francs. 39 This drastic difference in cost reflects the persistence of demand, even in
the face of steadily rising prices. Fear of denunciation to the German authorities had
some effect in maintaining relatively fair costs, but as this example of butter prices
illustrates, not by much. The market was at it widest in big cities like Paris or Tours. In
these urban centers it often relied not on familial ties but on anonymity. Whatever its
size or prices, the black market became an integral part of life under occupation. Nearly
everyone in France participated in it somehow, whether as buyers or suppliers, or on a
large or small scale.40 It became fundamental to survival. It has been estimated that in
1942 an average Parisian got 1725 calories from rations, 200 from the black market and
an additional 200 from colis familiaux.41
A parallel black market existed for ration cards.

These tickets functioned

essentially as a second form of currency and quickly became highly prized commodities
– as Fabre-Luce says, the most valuable form of money.42 Not only were false cards
created, but the originals were also stolen at every stage of production and distribution.43

39
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In addition, whether fake or real, a furious trade in ration cards took place. Clothing
tickets were the most popular to trade away, as they were arguably the least essential.44
This trade allowed even those without a surplus of francs to participate in the black
market.
Despite the prevalence of the black market, and perhaps aggravated by the failure
of the rationing system, shortages persisted throughout the Occupation. There simply
were not enough of the necessities to meet the population’s demands. In the Occupied
Zone, meat, bread and potatoes were constantly undersupplied. This was felt particularly
hard in urban areas, where desperate citizens occasionally turned to eating cats, pigeons,
and even guinea pigs.45 In 1940 a typical adult in Paris consumed 350 grams of bread a
day. By 1943 this had dropped to 180 grams a day.46
Food was not the only scarcity. The German army requisitioned as much leather
as they could get their hands on to furnish their soldiers with boots.47

Leather

requisitioning began as early as fall 1940 but seems to have lasted throughout the war. In
the absence of available leather, shoes were soled using wood, cork, or occasionally even
paper.48 It is here that we can begin to see the resourcefulness of the French population.
Parisian women, known in peacetime for their elegance and style, saw no need to
surrender this image to the war.

When perms became unavailable, they turned to

elaborate hats, decorated with flowers or birds.49

For these women, there was no

sacrificing style. Tobacco, a necessity for much of the population, was also subject to
44
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requisitioning, once again to fill the needs of the German army. Already by April 1941,
Henri Drouot reports that there was simply none left in the city of Dijon.50 A new tabac
national was developed at the domestic level, using a mixture of dried grass and herbs.51
This was an example of the système D, from the French se débrouiller meaning to
manage or get by, a celebrated result of occupation. When coffee beans ran short, roasted
acorns took their place. Liquorices and even boiled pumpkins were used to replace
sugar.52 The reliance on a vast array of substitutes characterized le système D, which
itself characterized life in France under the occupation. Historians and contemporaries
alike have seen in this an ingenuity admirable in the French.53
Much more serious than a shortage of tobacco or a dearth of available perms was
the growing scarcity of coal.

The Germans requisitioned a majority of what was

produced, both for their administration in France and for the needs of the Front.54 Trains
laden with French coal could be seen crossing the country, bound for Germany and
Italy.55 This scarcity became particularly pronounced in the unusually hard winters of
1940-41 and 1941-42.56 Coal became a highly prized commodity in extralegal trading.
SNCF railway workers, who had privileged access to coal during its transport, were often
responsible for its availability on the black market.57
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Transportation was also changed by the war. Petrol was badly needed, and in
large quantities, for the German war effort against the Soviet Union. Henri Drouot
remarks several times in his journal on the silence reigning over Dijon, once no one could
drive.58 In addition to the practical shortage of available petrol, the Germans also
established limits on how many cars were allowed on the roads – in Paris, for example, as
of 1940 there were only 7000 permits available for private cars.59 Many other cars had
been requisitioned for the German forces.60 In the absence of automobiles, the French
turned increasingly to bicycles for transportation – by 1944 there were 2 million bikes in
Paris.61

Evidence has even been found suggesting a black market specifically for

bicycles and bicycle parts.62
Shortages were accompanied by physical and psychological repercussions. This
psychological hunger doubled the actual hunger.63 Children growing up during the war
were markedly shorter than average, due to malnutrition. Minor infections were rampant
as people lacked the strength to fight them off. One author describes malnutrition in
Paris as leading to skin drying out, cracking and even developing boils due to vitamin
deficiencies.64 In 1942 the mortality rate in Paris was 42% higher than between 193238.65 These changes could not fail to have a psychological impact and left many citizens
numb. It can be argued that it created a preoccupation with day-to-day survival that
paralyzed, or at least delayed, the development of an effective resistance movement.
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According to historian Ian Ousby, “In retrospect this would seem, to many of those who
did manage to survive, the real humiliation of being occupied: they had thought of
themselves and their stomachs when they should have been thinking of France.”66 This
statement is supported both by Ousby’s fellow historians who point to a preoccupation
with finding the next meal as characteristic of the occupation, as well as contemporary
journals, which all share a remarkable preoccupation with availability and costs of food.67
A discussion of food and the changing market dominates both Alfred Fabre-Luce
and Henri Drouot’s journals. Fabre-Luce pinpoints the fall of 1940 as the first alarm,
when unfamiliar foods began entering the market. Alfalfa, traditionally used as horse
feed, entered the human diet as well.68 By mid 1941, he likens food to El Dorado: rare
and highly sought after.69 With his journalist’s eye, Fabre-Luce was able to discern the
issues of class exposed by shortages. The first reaction the French have to rationing, he
notes, was to simply use more capital to obtain what they wanted. Those with money,
then, still had access to almost everything, through some means or another.70 He also
emphasizes the reciprocity that grew from shortages and the black market – those looking
for tobacco, for example, would bring a chicken with them. To get something, you first
had to have something.71
The beginning of the occupation in Dijon, writes Drouot, was marked by a supply
crisis, when peasants refused to send their goods to market at the new German imposed
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prices.72

Drouot is particularly assiduous in monitoring the market, including a

discussion of prices, availabilities and rumors. One such rumor alleged that sending
potatoes to Paris, presumably in the popular colis familiaux, was illegal and could result
in a fine of 2000 francs.73 Another rumor, that requisitioned supplies were feeding the
entire Nazi army, particularly plagued the ravitaillement, to the point that the Germans
felt compelled to issue several newspaper articles assuring the population of the
contrary.74 As of October 1940, no lack of food yet beleaguered life in Dijon, but within
a few short months there was a constant lack of milk and almost no meat.75 On February
27 Drouot notes that clothing stores throughout the city had closed because they simply
had nothing left to sell. The next day he reports that the departments prefects had ordered
the pâtisseries to close – lavish pastries used valuable supplies of necessities such as flour
and butter, and were henceforth available only to Germans and select collaborators.76
By spring of 1941, Drouot describes a veritable “crise de ravitaillement.”77 A
kilo of butter had reached 42 francs in Dijon, and by May no eggs, potatoes or butter
were available at the market. Drouot provides a good illustration of changes in ration
portions over time – in April 1941 adults were allotted 50 grams of beef per person over a
week long period. By June it had risen to 80 grams a week.78 Rations were in constant
flux, subject to an economy under siege, and could rise or fall at any time. Drouot says
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that it would be an exaggeration to say anyone in Dijon was dying of hunger; rather, he
notes sardonically, people are hurried to their deaths by it.79
City dwellers like Drouot or Fabre-Luce were subjected to endless queuing and
waiting under the occupation. Ration card in hand, they could wait for hours on end, for
only paltry supplies.

Priority cards aggravated this situation, allowing those who

possessed them to bypass the odious queues, often leaving nothing remaining in their
wake.80 Professional queuers even developed, allowing those with means the luxury of
having someone else do their waiting for them. Besides obtaining goods, queues served
other important functions. They provided a social and political forum for those deprived
of their political power under the occupation government. Police were well aware of the
potential of any queue to devolve into a demonstration or riot, in particular when goods
ran out of stock, as they frequently did. They also provided a conduit for information and
misinformation. The phrase “on dit,” meaning “they say,” acquired a cachet and reflects
the importance of this means of spreading knowledge, especially as newspapers came
under the control of the German censors.81 No one was spared rationing, so queues
brought all facets of urban society into contact and facilitated their trading information
and rumors in long wait times with little else to do, proving socially useful to a
disenfranchised population.
If price control and rationing had failed, wage control proved much more
successful. While prices continued to climb, wages remained stagnant. Between 1939
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and 1943, real wages fell by 37%.82 Prices were increasing an average of 17% a year
next to wages that hadn’t risen since 1940.83 This compounded the sufferings of a
population already under significant economic stress, at the mercy of widespread
shortages. Eventually about 2/3 of the population could not afford to buy the minimum
ration diet (1400 calories a day) due to a combination of stagnated wages and steadily
increasing prices.84 Aggravating this, the franc had been substantially devalued under
German stewardship. 20 million marks were equivalent in value to 400 million francs.85
Collaboration
Under the occupation, French and German industry became intertwined and
interdependent.

7000 French firms were taking German orders, both civilian and

military, in 1941. By 1944 that number had doubled.86 Ironically, it was German
demand that quite literally resuscitated French industry, giving it a much needed second
lease on life. 70-90% of orders taken by French firms during the war years came from
Germany.87 The Renault Company is an excellent example of this new partnership.
Owned by Frenchman Louis Renault, prior to the war the company had been among the
leading automobile manufacturers in France. Louis Renault seems to have understood
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quickly which way the wind was blowing – in July 1940, within a month of the armistice,
he had applied for permission to build for the German air force.88
Since France was technically neutral, the idea of making war machines to be used
against France’s former allies was disconcerting. Provisions were made, therefore, so
that while French companies produced the bulk of a tank, submarine, or warplane, they
did not outfit them with any destructive weaponry.89 Obviously this did nothing to alter
the deadly nature of these products since any missing weapons were simply added later in
production, nor does it lessen France’s instrumental role in equipping the German war
machine – by 1944 French factories were producing as many as 800 planes a month. 90
Nevertheless, it is revealing as to a general hesitancy among the French to enable the
German army, in spite of state endorsed collaboration.
Workers employed in factories like Renault present an interesting dilemma in
terms of collaboration. It goes without saying that, lacking the cooperation of these
workers, economic collaboration would have failed. Factory employees, and indeed,
even captains of industry like Louis Renault himself, viewed their economic partnership
with the Germans as circumstantially necessary and politically neutral.91 Particularly in
the beginning of the war, historian Werner Rings identifies a “general tendency and
readiness of the inhabitants of occupied territories to compromise with the enemy for as
long as humanly possible.”92 This did not, however, mean that workers greeted their new
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partnership with enthusiasm: Rings concludes, “mute detestation and mute collaboration
were quite compatible” and, indeed, persisted throughout Occupied France.93
Economic collaboration is inseparable from the urban experience of occupation.
French industry was concentrated in the north, which became the Occupied Zone.94 The
majority of these were concentrated in northern cities – Renault, for example, was in
Boulogne-Billancourt, a suburb to the west of Paris.
The Germans held significant power over French industry. According to Henri
Drouot, they had forced 1500 factories to close down by June 1942, particularly in the
region around Paris (which, as mentioned above, held the greatest concentration of
industry in France).95 These factories – predominantly paper mills, and ceramic, fabric
and furniture plants – distracted from the war effort and diverted much needed resources,
both in raw materials and in manpower.
Perhaps the most famous, or rather infamous, examples of collaboration, though,
were not economic at all. Rather, they were the relationships that developed between
German soldiers and French women. This begs the question: Can such interpersonal
relationships be interpreted as collaboration? Whether or not we choose to in hindsight,
contemporaries certainly answered yes. Women who consorted with Germans met harsh
reprisals in the wake of Liberation – their heads were shaved as a public reminder of their
shame, with them as long as it took their hair to grow out.96
It is impossible to determine how many French women entered into romantic or
sexual relationships with German soldiers. Even at the height of German power, the
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majority of these relationships were conducted clandestinely. Although relationships
sprung up in all geographical areas, they were at their most prevalent in urban areas
where the population of German soldiers were highest. In 1940, for example, Paris was
host to some 40,000 Germans, forty percent of the entire German presence.97 Other
urban centers, though less concentrated than Paris, also had high populations of Germans.
Urban areas also offered degree of secrecy for the women, as even during the war at the
height of German power such relations were frowned upon. The natural anonymity of
urban life provided an aid.
It is revealing to examine the interpersonal relationships between German soldiers
and French women through an economic lens. A large majority of women who found
themselves in compromising positions with occupying soldiers belonged to lower
economic orders. It was common for them to work in cafés or hotels frequented by
Germans, thus putting them in close contact with soldiers and facilitating any
interactions.

Author Simone de Beauvoir kept a journal documenting her life in

Occupied Paris. She recounts seeing a veritable throng of “tarty” girls gathered around
Germans in the cafés.98
Resistance
Urban centers were the initial birthplace of the resistance, although as the war
progressed it became an increasingly rural movement.99 Prior to 1942, though, resistance
within France was primarily northern and urban – centered in cities like Paris or Tours.
Urban resistance pre-1942 had not yet acquired a large degree of organization and instead
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was largely limited to isolated incidents. Cutting cables was a particularly common act
of sabotage.100 These cables facilitated the smooth functioning of the German military
machine. Graffiti was also prevalent – the words “A bas le gouvernement de Vichy”
appeared as early as 1940 in Dijon, scrawled across a wall near a public square.101 As the
war progressed “V” for victoire began appearing throughout Dijon, as well as in other
cities.102 The victory it called for was Allied, not German. Clearly neither act of
vandalism was particularly threatening to the German soldiers – communication cables
were quickly replaced and graffittied phrases posed no real danger – but their importance
lay in their symbolism. Both declared that the French, though temporarily beaten, were
not yet defeated. Germans met these actions with collective fines and occasionally with
violent reprisals, yet somehow their symbolic potency was not diminished.103
Historian Robert Gildea conducted a study of resistance, reprisals, and their
effects on local populations. One of his primary case studies took place in Nantes in
October 1941. Lieutenant-Colonial Holtz, the Feldkommandant of Nantes and the LoireInferieure, was assassinated.104 Far from the enthusiasm one might expect, the Nantais
greeted the assassination with horror. Holtz had been a popular figure, liked and trusted
by the local populace. Furthermore, Holtz had been a known entity. Who would Berlin
replace him with? The fear of reprisals was very real and quickly substantiated: 48
hostages were executed immediately as an incentive for those with information regarding
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the assassination to come forward.

It was only by the intervention of Otto von

Stulpnagel, France’s military governor, that 50 additional hostages scheduled to be
executed were saved.105 Far from rallying Nantes to the cause of Resistance, this event
repelled the city from it. Efforts at collaboration were intensified in an attempt to repair
the damages done by the assassination.106 Following Liberation, General Charles de
Gaulle delayed visiting Nantes and endorsing its new government until January of 1945,
months after he had visited neighboring Angers and given them his support.107 He had
not forgiven the city its behavior after the hostage crisis.

The case of the Nantes

assassination is extremely important. It reveals that, in spite of mounting Franco-German
tensions and the prevalence of symbolic cable cutting and graffiti, resistance was not
universally popular, even in areas under the full weight of to the occupation.
Social Conditions
Anarchy and lack of societal structure facilitated crime during the occupation.
The lines between police and criminals increasingly blurred in the face of the black
market. Frequently, law enforcement turned a blind eye to black market activity, and
even participated in it.108 As one law enforcement officer put it, “Je fermerai les yeux sur
vos petits trafics. En compensation, soyez raisonnables: approvisionne la marche.”109
Jurisdiction also became increasingly problematic. Wanting to prove their abilities and
gain autonomy, French police forces often stepped in: “In the end the French police and
administration, imagining that they were acting independently, in fact simply did the dirty
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work of the SS and then found matters taken out of their hands.110 It was French forces,
not German, who were responsible for rounding up Parisian Jews in July 1942 and
placing them in the Vélodrome d’Hiver, a bicycling center outside Paris, to await their
fate in collective misery that a modern observer might compare to the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.111
Faux policiers, literally meaning fake policemen, capitalized on the prevailing
atmosphere of chaos. Impersonating law enforcement, criminals would extort bribes,
steal and menace the population.

This practice depended on anonymity and could

flourish in big cities, Paris in particular. Between 1941 and 1945, over 800 thefts by faux
policiers were reported in the metropolis.112
A list of forbidden behavior dominated the lives of France’s urbanites. Exhibiting
hostility to Germans was prohibited, as was offering aid to former French soldiers, or to
anyone attempting to cross into the Free Zone. Any exposure to foreign propaganda was
strictly banned, whether via radio (keeping radio transmitters was criminalized) or via
communication with any country unfriendly to the Reich. The possession of hidden
weapons was, understandably, forbidden, but so too were less obvious acts of subversion,
like taking photographs outdoors, assembling without express permission, or displaying
flags.113 It is no surprise that the German verboten was quick to enter the French
lexicon.114

110

Gildea, Marianne in Chains, 255.
Allan Mitchell, Nazi Paris (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008) 90.
112
Vinen The Unfree French, 239.
113
Ousby, Occupation, 113.
114
Irene Nemirovsky, Suite Française (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) 198.
111

30

One of the most significant, if also the most obvious, results of living in an urban
area during the occupation was the physical presence of Germans. The army took over
large civilian buildings like schoolhouses and seminaries to create administrative
centers.115 Many organizations ceased functioning, including the University of Dijon,
where Drouot himself held a position on the faculté des lettres.116 Their pressure on
civilians was most severe and most personal when it came to billeting soldiers with
French families. This practice drew the attention of many contemporaries including Irene
Nemirovsky and Jean Bruller, both of whom featured it as a key element in their
fictionalized versions of occupation.117 Billeting was not as widespread as either novel
would suggest – neither Drouot nor Fabre-Luce make any mention of it – but their shared
emphasis on it reflects its intrusiveness. It confronted French citizens with a daily
reminder of their dire circumstances.
Billeting represented perhaps the most extreme instance of Franco-German
interactions.

The majority of these interactions, by contrast, took place outside the

domestic sphere. Work brought together the largest numbers of French and Germans,
particularly in construction: the ports and aerodromes built throughout the Occupied
Zone providing the most notable example of this.118 The French characterize the initial
German presence as “unnatural.”119 This fits with our modern perspective, which tends
to squirm at images of Nazis marching down the Champs Elysees, which seem almost
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sacrilegious in their incongruity. As the war progressed, though, the German presence
became habitual, virtually unnoticeable and quite unremarkable in its familiarity.120
Jean Guehenno, a renowned French writer of the war period, wrote an essay in
1943 entitled To the German I Pass in the Street that characterizes the ambivalence with
which he and his compatriots saw the German presence.

He advises his fellow

Frenchmen to feign ignorance and blindness around their occupiers, pointedly ignoring
them. The object, he says, is to deny them “the warmth of a glance exchanged.”121 He
does, however, concede the ambiguity of the situation – amongst the Germans, there are
all kinds of people, he recognizes, just as there are amongst the French. He notices one
German soldier in particular, an old man whom he passes virtually everyday, and sees his
loneliness and humanity.122 Guehenno’s analysis reflects the difficult reality he shared
with his contemporaries. On the one hand, the Germans could be dissolute – in one
instance in Dijon, Drouot describes them peeing on a wall – but the French also
recognized their occupiers as humans.123 Nonetheless, a silent, tacit agreement existed
between the French, to behave as if the occupier, and even the war itself, simply did not
exist.124
Electricity failure has been cited as “an unsung story of the German Occupation”
and was an extremely important aspect of social conditions, particularly in urban areas.125
The uncertainty of electricity plagued the population and is mentioned by several
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contemporaries, including Fabre-Luce. He claims that it would be better to go without
electricity entirely than wait anxiously for it to run out. Electricity was not the only
uncertainty he cited – running water and gas were also only sporadically available.126
In fact, the Germans went out of their way to behave among the French. Though
attempts to pacify the French populace may certainly have had sinister undertones, they
nonetheless drastically reduced the harshness of occupation.

Germans specifically

decided not to treat France like another Poland.127 According to Ousby, “Germans
viewed France with a respect they did not feel for Poland or Czechoslovakia or
Yugoslavia.”128 Anticipating the atrocities that had accompanied the First World War,
French citizens were initially shocked by the German’s behavior.129 The word used most
often to describe it is “correct” and it appears in multiple sources. Germans soldiers in
France, in particular before 1942, behaved more like tourists than like a conquering
army.130 They respected French culture and saw their time their as a veritable culinary
vacation. It was a common sight in Dijon to see the resident Germans eating steak in
restaurants while the majority of the local population went without.131

In Paris

especially, soldiers on leave from other parts of the Occupied Zone would see the sights
and spend money freely.
Perhaps one of the most striking features of urban occupation though is the
continuity in city life. Simone de Beauvoir’s War Journal stands testament to this. She
recounts returning to her “usual table” at Le Dôme, where she can see placards
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advertising that day’s plat du jour.132 Loneliness and hunger were everywhere, but so too
were sings of life and prosperity. In fact, some historians have cited the “superficial
normality of wartime Paris” as one of the greatest shocks of the occupation.133 Unlike
other occupied territories, France preserved a large degree of autonomy, visible it its
overall normalness: “Food was short, to be sure, but something could always be rustled
up at dinner parties attended by a young aesthete with the right connections.”134 At the
end of the day, then, Paris was still Paris.
The enduring, and, indeed, growing, popularity of cinema under the occupation
attests to this overlay of normality. Movie going reached new heights of popularity
during occupation. Parisian cinemas saw record ticket sales during the war.135 To a
beleaguered population, movies provided a form of escapism, an alternative to the harsh
realities of daily life.
Conclusion
Yet even given certain continuities or any available escapism, urban life during
German Occupation was a unique event, almost impossible to capture: “the experience
was oddly elusive even at the time and almost impossible to reconstruct faithfully in
retrospect.”136 This makes the work of historians even harder, as we are presented with a
series of half recollections and pieced together memories. However, it is possible to
construct an image of the urban experience of the occupation, given these pieces. The
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sources I have chosen to use – primarily the wartime diaries of Alfred Fabre-Luce and
Henri Drouot, with some additions by French authors like Simone de Beauvoir or Jean
Guehenno, all supplemented by secondary research and historiography – proved
particularly rich. Put together, they present a detailed picture of Occupied France, and
identify the key concern of contemporary French: their day-to-day existence. This is
born out by the frequency with which food availability and market prices are cited – both
pepper the writings of Fabre-Luce and Drouot, as well as appearing throughout de
Beauvoir’s journal. Thus we can conclude that, more than anything, urban occupation
was characterized by this preoccupation.

Historiography confirms this: one French

historian writes that “Between 1940 and 1944, the average French citizen spent most of
his or her time trying to find something to put in the pot for dinner.”137 Perhaps this does
not present the most honorable or exciting image of cities in wartime France. But it does
give us a realistic one. The image of the majority of French was “a débrouillard, a
survivor, who was neither heroic nor utterly abject, but adapted to difficult
circumstances.”138 Urban life in Occupied France was full of uncertainty – how to deal
with the Germans one was forced to encounter throughout the day; what to do should the
electricity supply run out, as it almost invariably did; whether or not to take an
ideological stance, siding with the collaborators or the resistors; how to stretch a
paycheck in a declining and controlled economy; and, most importantly, how to navigate
that economy to subsist and live out the war.
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Ch 2. Occupation in the Countryside
Introduction
Historiography has tended to deemphasize the effects of the German occupation
on the French countryside. While Paris and other cities may have been ravaged by
hunger, the countryside allegedly emerged unscathed. Not merely unscathed, in fact, but
wealthier and more powerful for having living through the war.139 One official in the
Eure department in Haute-Normandie said in 1942 that “The rural part of the population,
which scarcity affects little as far as farmers are concerned and which earns more money
than ever, does not seem unhappy with its fate.”140 Irene Nemirovsky on the other hand,
a French author whose own experience in l’exode and under Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws
dictated much of her writing, wrote “In the countryside nothing changed, everyone just
waited. They waited for the war to end, for the blockade to be lifted, for the prisoners to
come home, for the end of winter.”141
So what then was the experience of the average paysan and small town
dweller?142 Was the war and subsequent occupation an unlooked for boon for France’s
ailing countryside?

Did France’s small towns and open country live through the

occupation with little involvement and less change? The answer is both, and neither.
Undeniably, some farmers prospered through the new black market and economic
system. Even in polycultural areas, however, hardship was just as common as affluence.
Playing the role of supplier was a dangerous game and, if detected, ran the risk of severe
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penalties.143 Small towns and villages faced economic privations and shortages of their
own.

The new laws of economics came with social changes that ranged from the

presence (or absence) of German soldiers to complex questions of loyalty and survival.
The occupation was more than the revenge of the countryside, of les paysans
triomphant.144 It was a new world to be navigated – a task some took to more than others
– but changes in the countryside were real and palpable, if also occasionally dulled and
distant. The best way to understand the new rhythms of rural life is through the lives of
those that felt them. Marie-Louise Osmont kept a diary throughout the war, while living
in her chateau on the Normandy coast, three miles from Sword Beach, one of the
eventual landing sites of the Allied forces during the D Day invasions in June 1944.145
Osmont was a wealthy woman, thanks to her marriage to Dr. Osmont, whom she met
while volunteering for the Red Cross during the First World War. The doctor died
shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, leaving Marie-Louise isolated in
Château Périers, the Osmont family seat in Périers, Normandy, a town of some 250
people.146

By virtue of wealth and geography, Marie Louise Osmont’s wartime

experience was truly extraordinary, including witnessing first hand the Allied and
German fighting that followed D Day. Her diary is rich with everyday information,
including her interactions with and opinions of German soldiers quartered with her, and
brief discussions of shortages, market availability, as well as a revealing commentary of
143
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social conditions. She provides a glimpse into France’s social stratification. Though it
predates the war by centuries, it persists during the years of occupation and greatly colors
personal experiences and opinions. Unwittingly, Osmont offers a window into this world
and its innate prejudices, both through her own aristocratic distance, and in discussion of
her domestic servants, who may have lived in the same place as her during the war, but
whose experiences differed radically.
Some 225 kilometers south and west of Périers, depending on the route, lies St.
Brieuc, Brittany.

Though St. Brieuc was a regionally important market town, its

population in 1940 was small, roughly 40,000 – it can thus still be counted outside urban
life and equated with the countryside that surrounded it.147 From 1899 to 1980, it was
home to Louis Guilloux, a renowned French author. Between 1921 and 1974, Guilloux
kept a journal recounting his daily life and experiences called the Carnets. 148 Since
Guilloux was a cultural figure of some repute, his experience may have differed from that
of his fellow Bretons. Bearing this in mind, he is still an extremely valuable source. He
was an excellent observer and, perhaps significantly, focused not solely on the war or the
marketplace, but mainly his own personal life, reflecting a persistent normalcy not
apparent in Osmont’s experiences further down the coast, closer to the war’s immediate
impact.
The two accounts, taken together, present very different pictures of the rural
civilian’s life under the occupation. Their distinct focuses and experiences are revealing
– what begins to emerge are experiences dictated by region. The resistance movement,
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temptation to collaborate, requisitioning and black marketeering – these were
omnipresent and, indeed, virtually inescapable.

But in France’s countryside, it was

geography that determined their degree.
Economic Conditions
The countryside was the most important part of the complex economic web, both
legal and not, that developed under German occupation. While cities demanded, the
countryside supplied.

It was this role that has caused some to see the rise of the

countryside during the occupation.

Unlike Haussmanian or Third Republic France,

Vichy favored and actively promoted rural areas, as France’s cultural and moral
backbone.149 This gave paysans moral high ground (at least theoretically), but control
over production and distribution gave them real power.

The survival of France’s

agricultural sector was crucial to France as a whole surviving the war. However, rural
France not only produced essential supplies badly needed by their urban counterparts, but
also added its own strain on these supplies.
By virtue of the basic nature of economic production, the countryside had a
natural and complete monopoly in agricultural production. Over time, this monopoly
became increasingly problematic.

Mounting difficulties in transportation disrupted

preexisting trade patterns. Occasionally this resulted in trade being conducted erratically,
but it could also cause a trade route to disappear entirely. The availability of working
trucks and automobiles was greatly affected by the occupation.150 Petrol was highly
prized by the German army and requisitioned frequently, as well as occasionally cars
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themselves. With the disturbance of trade patterns and ordinary urban-rural exchanges,
products tended to move less, becoming increasingly fixed to their points of production.
Regionalism reigned and effected trade patterns just as much as it did mentalities –
loyalties shrank from nation to region or even town.151 This gave much of the economic
power, particularly in terms of agriculture, to the countryside. Especially when France
faced blockade and trade restrictions, proximity to the source of production became
crucially important.
Yet even with proximity, the availability and pricing of different foodstuffs varied
regionally.

Single crop regions, for example, lacking self-sufficiency, were more

susceptible to the rise and fall of government-imposed prices and the frequently
mercenary nature of the black market.152 Multi-crop regions, by nature more easily selfreliant, were at a comparative advantage.

It was no coincidence that the Germans

occupied precisely those territories, the north and the west, which were the most fertile
and the most diverse in their products.153 The Free Zone, southern France, specialized in
non-essential products such as wine and olives. Products not immediately available
could easily become prohibitively expensive in such environments.
One commonality, which seems to have spanned regions and perhaps even
bridged some of the gaps in the pervasive localism, was the black market. While other
economic sectors faltered or failed entirely, it positively flourished during the occupation.
For a producer, not participating in the black market would almost invariably result in a
net loss. Purchasing a cow, for example, would cost an estimated 9000 francs. The price
151
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fixed for resale by the French authorities was only 7000 francs.154 The initial loss of
2000 francs is only the beginning, as the cost of keeping and feeding the cow for months
could be equally excessive.

Piglets, too, lost nearly half their value in the official

market.155 Government regulated prices could not keep pace with the inflated values of
goods. Selling through the marche amical or the black market presented a much more
profitable option.156
The best way of doing this was often by selling direct. If customers came directly
to a farm, suppliers were able to share the risks of marketeering with their buyers. It was
by far the most effective way of circumnavigating the authorities, as colis familiaux could
easily be confiscated in transit.157 Urbanites throughout France began taking regional
trains into the countryside to find supplies and prices more favorable than those in the
cities. These trains took the names of popular vegetables and became known as trains
des haricots, trains des pommes de terre, etc.158
From the suppliers perspective, selling directly and avoiding as much of the
requisition as possible makes a great deal of sense. Both Vichy and German authorities
imposed fixed prices, which were invariably much lower than the market value of any
given product. Indeed, the disparity between the black market value of a product and its
fixed price could, and often did, differ radically. In 1943, for example, the government
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set cost of a dozen eggs was 24 francs, while on the marche amical the price was 53
francs, and on the black market it was 76, three times the regulated price. In the same
year, the price of rabbit ranged from 26 francs officially, to 39 through the marche amical
and 52 francs on the black market.159 Through the extralegal channels available through
the black market and the marche amical, the supplier regained primacy. The majority of
risks ran with the supplier, from acquiring a product (in particular if that product passed
through several hands before reaching its final destination – hence why selling direct was
so popular) to ensuring that transactions passed unnoticed by authorities.160 When black
marketeering was discovered, it was met with heavy fines and occasional internment.161
The French perspective on profiteering was complex and at times contradictory.
If done in moderation, the French overall approved the process. From an economic
standpoint, they recognized its utility and necessity. Without black marketers willing to
take large risks to turn a profit, the history of the occupation would be far different,
marked by a dramatic increase in scarcity and suffering.
essential.

Moderation, though, was

Anything else was perceived as taking advantage of one’s nation and

countrymen. “A distinction was… drawn between those who profited excessively from
the misery of the compatriots and those who merely tried to make ends meet.”162 “Fair”
dealings were of a premium importance.

It is an odd twist of fate, and perhaps

characteristic of the entire occupation, that “By the terrible logic of the Occupation, the
French who went hungry kept most of their anger for the French who ate well.”163 This
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notion of wrongly diverted anger runs throughout literature documenting the occupation.
The suggestion, though it remains largely implicit, is that had that anger been directed at
the German occupiers as its primary target, France could have presented a stronger
defensive front. This theory suggests national strength and possibility frustrated by the
weaker sides of human nature, reveling in shared suffering and ignoring the larger shared
experience of occupation.
Occasionally, albeit rarely, tension resulting from the economic disparities and the
unequal distribution of goods (both real and perceived) erupted into violence.164 This
occurred most frequently when city dwellers took the train des legumes into rural areas,
to tap into rumored stores of supplies. Sometimes farmers refused to trade with these
foragers, most often because they already had economic relationships in place. Urbanites
imagined farmers and their fellow paysans to be in possession of an enormous wealth of
supplies.165 This perceived prosperity stood in stark contrast to the scarcity that so often
plagued France’s cities during the occupation and aggravated nerves already strained by
shortages.
Violence is a radical, and rare, example of the tension that arose between the city
and the countryside under the occupation. More often, it manifested itself in other ways,
most persistently a simmering overlay of distrust and suspicion that pervaded the entire
occupation.166 In fact, this mutual suspicion predates World War Two by centuries. It
was evident in the Great Fear of 1789, when each side imagined their imminent peril at
the hands of the other. It was in place even before this in the eighteenth century, when
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peasants freshly emigrated into Paris were the first ones that civil authorities turned on in
times of trouble.167 During the occupation, city dwellers assumed that farmers and
paysans were hoarding supplies and purposefully keeping them off the market.168 There
is some truth to this allegation, as farmers held back supplies both for their own use and
for the extralegal channels available to them through the black market and the marche
amical.

Not every farmer or producer grew wealthy under the occupation, though.

While they may have been able to sell goods at unprecedented prices in the black market,
they were subject to these same prices themselves in the costs of production. The price
of maintaining farm equipment hiked with inflation. Some farmers certainly made their
fortune on the black market during the war years, but just as many were pressed by the
same scarcity and uncertainty that plagued French cities.169
Neither Guilloux nor Osmont provide extensive discussions of economics under
the occupation in general, or of the black market specifically. This omission can be
interpreted in several ways. First, it is possible that neither of them ranked it as a very
high priority – at least not enough to write about it. This in turn would imply that
supplies were, by and large available, even given the effects of the occupation. Second,
they may not have participated in the black market, or at least done so very little,
although evidence suggests that nearly everyone in France was involved in the black
market somehow, so this explanation seems unlikely.170 Finally, they could have omitted
any mention of the black market for the sake of self-preservation. The black market was,
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after all, illegal, and writing down one’s purchases and interactions, even in a private
diary, could prove a dangerous thing.
Reading Guilloux’s account of the occupation alone, one would be left with the
impression that there was no black market, let alone a vibrant and flourishing one,
equally alive in a town like St Brieuc as in a city like Paris. One oblique reference is
made in passing, to an acquaintance of Guilloux’s selling beef to German soldiers
stationed in the town above the market price.171 Guilloux does not explore the issue any
further than this passing aside, implying distance from the market, possibly resulting
from his social class and prestige. Though she too addresses the black market very
infrequently, Osmont offers a few more mentions.

They amount to almost side

comments but are tantalizing as to what they reveal. Osmont alludes several times to the
fact that her cook at her chateau is a key player in Normandy’s black market.172 His
activities cross party lines, as most of what he sold – meat, butter, cognac – went to the
resident German soldiers.
Osmont and Guilloux provide illustrations of the effects of rationing and the
practicalities of availability. This very omission of the subject strongly suggests that both
Brittany and Normandy were well supplied for the bulk of the war. Furthermore, it
causes the infrequent suggestions of hunger or shortages to stand out all the more.
Osmont’s first reference to experiencing hunger occurs late – not until 1943 – but seems
to reflect a problem that has been developing for a while. She describes cooking nettles
like one would ordinarily cook chopped spinach. It is not so bad, she said, “but without
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any fat, it’s certainly not very nourishing!”173

Drinking copious amounts of water

throughout the day was her preferred method for quieting the grumbling of an underfed
stomach.174 Nettles as a dietary supplement suggest very dire circumstances indeed.
Osmont’s later diary entries, however, imply that availabilities changed drastically, and
her household once more had access to plentiful food. In February of 1944, for example,
she describes the kitchen women peeling vegetables for eight hours a day, which seems
to suggest that available goods had changed considerably since the days of chopped
nettles.175 Whether the presence of many billeted Germans affected what the Osmont
household had access to is a matter of speculation, but it almost certainly did. The
Germans quartered in the chateau often brought milk and eggs to the cooks, who would
cook it up for them as a supplement to their rations.176 This implied sharing leads to
questions regarding whether supplies were held in common by the Germans and the
Osmont household. Did Marie-Louise have equal access to extra milk and eggs, in times
of plenty? Whatever the case, the notion of abundance is reemphasized in a entry made
in March of the same year, which describes feeding kitchen scraps to the dogs as “there
are plenty!”177 Scraps were so plentiful, in fact, that the dogs were gaining weight –
surely this would not have occurred in a kitchen strapped for resources.
Food was not the only good subject to the fortunes of war. Osmont’s car, for
instance, was requisitioned for use by the German army in April 1944. Osmont tried to
prevent them by putting powdered sugar in the gas tank – a rumored quick fix to
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temporarily disable a car – but the German mechanics managed to thwart her efforts by
fixing it and taking it anyways.178
For Louis Guilloux miles away from Osmont in St Brieuc, the situation appears to
have been quite different. While he makes clear that shortages were felt, they never seem
to become as dire as chopped nettles. His analysis reveals instead lesser versions of the
same supplies, or perhaps tightening one’s belt a notch or two, but nothing extreme.
Coffee and tobacco ran short, and Guilloux bemoaned that quality-typing paper was
virtually impossible to come by.179 When the Pentecost procession passed through the
streets of St Brieuc in 1941, the habitual candles were absent. The reason for this,
Guilloux reported, was twofold – they were forbidden, but impossible to find even if they
had been allowed.180 He complained early on about the quality of bread available – wet
bread, he explains, is for dogs, and dry bread is for prisoners.181 Guilloux was neither
and clearly felt himself to be superior to what the market was supplying. Wine and wool
were also missed early in the occupation.182 While neither of these are necessities (at
least not in the short term), wine in particular was missed in the French culture. Later on
in the occupation, though, the situation seems to have righted itself, or perhaps
normalized due simply to having been in place for so long. Wine was once again
obtainable, and, indeed, Guilloux seems to find nothing remarkable in its availability.183
Even coffee returned – in 1944, Guilloux drank some while eating a sandwich at a café,
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“comme hier.”184 His treatment indicates that, though shortages may have been felt in St.
Brieuc, they were neither severe nor long lasting.
Guilloux refers to several other shortages.

Bicycles, he reports, were

requisitioned for the German army, although this seems to have occurred late in the
occupation, May of 1944.185 Coal shortages, unlike other goods, hit the town hard, and
eventually reached such a dire point that coal shipments simply stopped arriving.186 No
doubt this material shortage was felt particularly keenly in the wet Breton winters.
Guilloux records the observations of one of his fellow Bretons in his journal,
regarding the ravages of the occupation. “The occupation left terrible memories. The
country has been ruined.

An intendant, employed to collect requisitions from the

recalcitrant, has used the infallible means of lodging garrisons with them, who behaved
themselves like gangsters.”187 The economic system of rural France was scarred by the
occupation. As this quotation suggests, much of that scarring was self-inflicted.
Collaboration
Castigation of those with plenty was a very real fear under the occupation.
Denunciations were widespread and pervasive. Conducting business with strangers led to
a greater risk of being denounced, and thus effectively limited black market circles in
their size.188 But denunciation was more than a fear – it was a weapon.189 It was a
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weapon, moreover, that was wielded almost exclusively by the French, against the
French. “Virtually all the matters that have resulted in French people being condemned
by German tribunals were brought to their notice through denunciations made by other
French people.”190
Hardship bred self-interest, and suspicion and distrust were made manifest
through personal attacks, often with the intent of settling old scores or profiting off the
anarchic and distrustful times.

Together, these factors created a culture mired in

misgiving and doubt. “J’irai le dire a la Kommandantur” was a common, and feared,
threat, which translates to a taunt warning that the speaker will report to the local German
authorities.191

The flood of denunciations received by both French and German

authorities is a blight on the French citizens who lived through the occupation. It belies
the fervent desire after the war to forget the role the French played in their own
occupation. Forgetting, though, is all but impossible, especially given the sheer volume
of accusations made.

They inundated authorities.

In her occupation novel Suite

Française, one of Irene Nemirovsky’s German officers says, “The first day we
arrived…there was a package of anonymous letters waiting for us at Headquarters.
People were accusing one another of spreading English and Gaullist propaganda, of
hoarding supplies, of being spies. If we’d taken them all seriously, everyone in the
region would be in prison.”192 Very few condemnations, however, made anonymously or
not, led to actual convictions – most “upon investigation, were revealed to have
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originated in personal jealousies or commercial rivalries and seldom led the police to the
discovery of serious criminal behavior.”193
Denunciations have been attributed primarily to women.194

Given the large

proportion submitted anonymously, this is difficult to verify, but it does follow the logic
of life under the occupation. Women were responsible for providing their families with
food in ever-shrinking markets. This bred jealousy over possessions, food in particular.
Neighborliness could quickly turn to hostility in such a competitive environment.
Nobody “want[ed] to seem richer than they were; they feared being denounced. There
wasn’t a single household that didn’t hide its provisions…housewives closed their
kitchen door at mealtimes so they wouldn’t be betrayed by the smell of lard sizzling in
the pot, or the piece of prohibited meat, or the cake made with illegal flour.”195
Accusations became a tool; a means of correcting grievances that often
encompassed tensions that existed before the war even began. This was a tradition long
before World War Two. It can be traced back to at least the French Revolution (and
probably before), specifically the Reign of Terror from 1793-1794, when efforts were
made to purge royalists and anyone who posed a threat to the floundering Republic.196
These too had more often been the result of personal vendettas than political realities, and
in the ensuing one hundred and fifty years, little had changed. In both instances, délation
became a form of policing, born of jealousy – stopping one’s neighbors from acquiring
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what one could not.197 Making a denunciation should not, however, be interpreted as
necessarily implying agreement with either the Vichy or the Nazi regime.198 It was
collaboration in a utilitarian sense, rather than an ideological one.
Horizontal collaboration similarly defied ideological identification, and it
occurred in the countryside as well as in cities. Marie-Louise Osmont alludes several
times to her belief that the women working in the chateau kitchen were untrustworthy and
indecent.

Though she never makes an explicit accusation, her suspicions are quite

clear.199 It is apparent to even the most casual reader that the women working in the
Osmont kitchen were conducting affairs with the German soldiers quartered in the
chateau and nearby areas.

Osmont’s judgment of them is harsh and unequivocal.

Furthermore, it is a judgment which seems to have been shared by virtually all of the
French, regardless of region or social class. It implies that engaging in such relationships
is un-French, a betrayal of the entire nation.
It is interesting, and revealing, to contrast Osmont’s reaction to the physical and
emotional relationships developing between her kitchen maids and German soldiers, and
the economic deals and trades taking place between her cook and, in all likelihood, the
very same German soldiers. The former are judged severely and with no attempt at
understanding. The latter, meanwhile, is thought of only momentarily, and then pushed
aside as Osmont bows to economic necessity. This seems indicative of the predominant
opinion throughout France, both during the occupation and reflecting backwards onto it
after Liberation. There is a reluctance to recognize the overriding similarities between
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horizontal collaboration and close economic relations. Both grew out of necessity and
were mutually beneficial relationships.

Both illustrate the complicated and varying

interactions that took place between occupiers and occupied. And yet the one has drawn
much less attention, while the other is virtually equivalent to treason.
Perhaps the reason for this disparity is the primary importance of sexuality and
gender relations to any culture. The experience of ignominious defeat and occupation
precipitated a crisis in French manhood, a nationwide emasculation. 200 This crisis was
augmented by the gender disparity that persisted throughout the occupation.

Some

1,400,000 Frenchmen had been taken prisoner in 1940 and were held in Germany
throughout the war.201 The dearth of young men was then filled by German soldiers.
These soldiers “eagerly anticipated” dalliances with French women during their time
there.202 That the Germans essentially replaced Frenchmen as the sexual partners of
French women must have further unmanned and disgraced the French. It also became a
way of casting blame – in France’s catastrophic collapse in 1940, loose morals were
blamed for the nations inability to defend itself and those women who entered into sexual
relationships with the Germans made easy scapegoats for Pétainists and Gaullists alike.
For the majority of the French, sexual complicity simply crossed a line that economic
collaboration did not – it went further in exposing the weaknesses and inadequacies of the
national system.
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Resistance
By late 1941-1942, resistance became an increasingly rural movement.203 It
moved away from what were initially isolated acts preformed by individuals in
predominantly urban settings, and into larger, more organized groups working together,
and occasionally even with the Resistance forces outside of France, most famously
Charles de Gaulle, who was based in London with his Free French forces.
This new means of resisting thrived in rural France, where a tradition of rebellion
was already in place. This tradition extended as far back as the Vendee Rebellion during
the French Revolution, which pit peasants and royalists against republicans.204
Geography also provided a natural advantage. Mountainous and forested regions served
as perfect hideaways for small, guerrilla forces.205 Rebellion could survive much more
easily in these areas than in open country. The most famous resistance movement to
emerge out of rural France in this environment was the maquis. The word maquis
literally means scrubland, and the French expression prendre le maquis means to go
underground. The maquis, then, was a loosely organized covert organization, functioning
throughout rural France. Size and structure, varied regionally, but it did share a few
commonalities across France. Everywhere it was composed of locals, people known in
the areas they operated in.206

The faces of resistors were familiar – men from

neighboring villages and towns. They were a guerrilla force, composed of volunteers, led
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by volunteers - “the grocer the truck driver, the schoolteacher, the policeman, men from
this district and from the next, men from the water’s edge and men from the farms lost in
the plains.”207
The largest numerical growth in the maquis is traditionally attributed to the
institution of the STO, or Service du Travail Obligatoire, which drafted the French into
forced labor in Germany. Instituted in February of 1943, this policy has been identified
as a, if not the, chief cause in alienating French citizens from the Vichy government and
pushing them towards the Resistance.208 Initially, only men between ages 20-22 were
eligible, with exemptions for farmers, miners, students and several other groups. Within
a year, eligibility had been expanded to men and women ages 18-45.209

Without

question, the STO was an extremely unpopular policy, and, more than any other single
act, left French citizens feeling disenchanted with and, more importantly, betrayed by
their government.210 Whether it in fact swelled the ranks of the maquis as has been
believed is a different question. One could easily be opposed to the German presence and
Vichy’s policies without joining the active resistance. There were a large number of
young men who became STO dodgers, going underground to avoid being sent to forced
labor in the Third Reich. Forged certificates of exemption and simply not showing up to
answer calls were very popular.211 Even Louis Guilloux drops a hint that may allude to
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his own son dodging the STO.212 It has been widely assumed that all of these men filled
the ranks of the maquis, and, indeed, many of them probably did. However, the maquis
numbers never seem to have reached such levels, and therefore many STO dodgers
remain unaccounted for.213 Especially on farms and in isolated rural areas, many dodgers
simply disappeared, going underground and reemerging at the Liberation.
One of the biggest problems facing any concentrated resistance was the inevitable
reprisals their actions incurred. Given the secretive nature of the maquis and other
resistance groups, it was impossible for the German authorities to target only active
resistors in their responses, which therefore fell onto entire communities. The most
popular form of reprisals was collective fines, levied against entire towns or villages.
This happened in St. Brieuc in 1943, when two German soldiers were wounded while on
duty in the town.214 The entire community was fined 2 million francs, to be paid within
five days. On good behavior, they would be reimbursed, but if not the money would be
kept.

These sanctions were intentionally designed to be debilitating and to turn

populations against the resistance, without resorting to mass executions or deportations.
Over time, however, this policy changed. Through 1941 and into early 1942,
reprisals fell most heavily on French Jews and communists.215 Mass deportations of
these isolated groups allowed German authorities to respond to resistors without
jeopardizing collaboration.216 Germans stationed in France saw the necessity of avoiding
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“Polish methods” in France, but those in Berlin did not always agree.217 As the war
progressed, deportations began to give way to executions. In early 1944 new instructions
were issued for a system of calibrated response, placing a premium on rapid, decisive
actions and justifying any harm to civilians as “entirely the fault of the terrorists.”218
This was the policy followed in the small town of Ascq in the Nord on April 1,
1944.

A train carrying Germany’s SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend towards the

Normandy coast was hit by explosives just outside the train station.219 No troops were
hurt but the rail line was broken, leaving the division vulnerable to any Allied aerial
attacks. Immediately action was taken – men were shot at the rail line itself and some
were taken from their homes and killed – eighty-six total.220 Collective punitive violence
reached its most deadly point on June 10, 1944, in the small town of Oradour-sur-Glane
in the Limousin, about forty miles outsides the regional capital, Limoges. Acting on
reports that resistance forces were operating in the area, a German battalion massacred
over 600 civilians living in the town and outlying farmlands. The level of violence in
Oradour can be partially explained by events elsewhere. Four days earlier, Allied troops
had landed in Normandy and the Germans were facing a bitter fight to maintain their hold
on France. As their position became more precarious, a cycle beginning as early as 1942,
reprisals became more and more severe.
Even the threat of violent punishment was not enough to deter some dedicated
resistors. The village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, a small town in the Auvergne, became
217

Neumaier, Escalation of German Reprisal Policy, 119.
Robert Gildea, Resistance, Reprisals and Community in Occupied France,
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, Vol. 13 (London: Royal
Historical Society, 2003) 168,
219
Gildea, Resistance, Reprisals, and Community, 167.
220
Gildea, Resistance, Reprisals, and Community, 169.
218

56

a haven for refugees during the occupation. Le Chambon was primarily Hugeunot, and
thus had a heritage of resisting government edicts stretching back to the sixteenth century
French Wars of Religion.221 André Trocme, the village’s pastor, spearheaded what
became a community wide effort to help Jews and other refugees cross the French border
into nearby neutral Switzerland.222 Needless to say, this put the village, and Trocme in
particular, at great risk as Vichy and German authorities could not fail to notice
something suspicious was happening in this tiny enclave of south-central France. The
story of Le Chambon provides a glimpse into the many different forms resistance could
take. Some people housed refugees permanently, others gave them temporary shelter.
Fake identity and ration cards were manufactured, food – already scarce – was found for
each refugee. Some people even took on the daunting task of leading the refugees over
the mountains into Switzerland.223 Everyone in the village played a part.
One of the most intriguing questions raised by the heroism of Le Chambon is why
there? Why is it only in this small village that resistance on such a massive, organized
scale occurred? Throughout France, both the Occupied and Free Zones, individuals and
groups aided their fellow French citizens – some people hid Jews in their homes, others
provided much needed food supplies to city folk cut off from normal trade routes.
Nothing ever reached the same magnitude as Le Chambon, though. The reasons for this
are unclear and, probably, unknowable.
Social Conditions
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In May and June 1940, refugees flooded the west and south as they fled from the
approaching German army. Guilloux watched them come in droves to St. Brieuc, from
Rouen, Paris and Ile de France.224 They came by train, by car, and even by foot. St.
Brieuc was by no means alone in receiving droves of refugees during the initial German
onslaught of 1940. They poured into the south and west of France from the north and the
east, pushing towards an unknown destination, and trying desperately to stay ahead of the
German armies. Approximately 1/6 of the population of France took to the road.225
L’exode presented a particular dilemma for farmers, faced with an advancing enemy
during the height of the agricultural season.226 In retrospect, the chaos of l’exode seems
futile because it was temporary. The Franco-German armistice reached on June 22
installed and entrenched German soldiers in France indefinitely.
This brought German soldiers into direct contact with citizens across France, in
both urban and rural settings.

Marie-Louise Osmont had a significant amount of

interaction with German soldiers.

Her chateau in Périers, standing close to the

strategically essential English Channel, was chosen to quarter large numbers of German
soldiers, the earliest group of which consisted of 2 NCOs and 4 enlisted men and arrived
in August 1940.227 Osmont refused to leave Château Périers, and was thus subjected to
what she describes as the continual heartbreak of seeing her beautiful home used to house
“Franzes.”228 Despite conceding that most of the soldiers were clean and discreet (to the
point that they became simply part of the background to her), Osmont still found their
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presence unbearable.229 But as each battalion of German troops moves on, she found
herself wishing they would stay. This suggests that familiarity bred comfort, rather than
a genuine attachment or trust. Over the weeks, and occasionally months, spent billeted
together, Osmont and her household came to know the Germans they were living with,
but new groups of soldiers represented a renewed threat – who could tell what each new
group might bring.230 This comfort in familiarity is reiterated throughout literature
regarding the relationships between occupiers and occupied.231 The familiar predictable
enemy was far safer than the unknown, untested one.
Due to its tactical location, billeting was very popular in Périers – in May 1944,
there were 220 Germans quartered in the small town, a number almost equal to the
population of the town itself.232 St. Brieuc, by contrast, had far fewer German soldiers. In
January 1941 Guilloux was visited at home by two German officers who had come there
for lodging. They left, indicating that they would return shortly for an extended stay, but
seem to have never returned.233 Thus Guilloux was spared the unenviable task preformed
by Osmont of quartering enemy soldiers – he never again mentions it as a possibility.
This disparity was due to geography – the Normandy coast was a far more likely landing
point than Brittany.
Guilloux describes one tense interaction with a German soldier, which stands out
against the staid nature of most of his diary entries.234 One day, in March of 1943, he
was walking down Rue Victor Hugo in St. Brieuc with his friend Elie. The two of them
229
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were walking and talking amongst themselves, when a German officer approached,
walking the opposite direction down the street. The two friends continued to walk,
oblivious to the fact that the German officer had signaled them to get out of his way, until
they were nearly on top of each other. Guilloux quickly stepped aside, but Elie was
slower and the German officer roughly elbowed his aside. Indignant, the two parties
exchanged hostile words and gestures for several minutes before eventually wandering
off to nurse their wounded pride, when they failed to make themselves understood.
Especially in the vulnerable coastal regions of France, frequent bombs dropped by
Allied forces seem to have been accepted with little complaint as a fact of life. Guilloux
mentioned them constantly, but rarely with any sense of fear or hostility.235 It would
seem easy for Guilloux to turn against the Allies after experiencing repeated
bombardments, but he merely reports them, never commenting, suggesting Allied
sympathies. Evidence suggests that this sentiment was widely shared throughout France
– the English and Americans were largely absolved of any civilian casualties their
preparatory strikes had.

After one 1943 aerial attack in the Loire had damaged a

locomotive parts factory, the workers “anger was aimed at the management for not
providing enough air raid shelters rather than against the British, whose skill in targeting
all twenty-four of their bombs on the factory itself they rather admired.”236 Indeed, it is
only natural that, following their own subjugation, the French should turn to the English,
their nearest ally, for salvation. As the war progressed and an Allied victory looked
increasingly probable, this feeling only increased.
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Radio united the people of France during the war, and city or country, provided
them with news of the outside world and the progress of the war. German authorities
foisted Philippe Henriot on the Vichy government, as their chief radio personality for
Radio Paris.

Until his assassination in 1944, Henriot was one of the most vocal

proponents of collaboration available to Vichy.237 Radio Paris, though, took a backseat to
BBC, the British Broadcasting Company, which, by 1942, was probably the single
greatest unifying institution in France.238 Through BBC, no matter where one lived, war
news was available without the filter of German or Vichy propaganda so prevalent on
Radio Paris and other collaborationist airwaves.
There is an overall sense of normalcy that persists in literature regarding the rural
occupation. This is primarily the result of distance. Between the armistice in June 1940
and D-Day in June 1944, there were no battles in France’s countryside and large
administrative bodies were in the cities, primarily Paris. In many ways, the war was far
away. Much of Louis Guilloux’s time was spent visiting his elderly mother in nearby St.
Laurent. He often bicycled there and back, occasionally bringing her butter or other
goods.239 He went to see the doctor for regular check ups, and even traveled to Paris and
Burgundy.240 Osmont, meanwhile, seems to have faced much harder times. All the
furniture had been removed from her chateau to maximize space for quartering
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soldiers.241 By 1944, the tires on her bike were completely worn away through overuse,
and there was nothing on the official market to replace them.242
Geography was a telling feature in determining one’s experience of the war.
Osmont’s tire treads were worn away and unusable, while Guilloux’s managed to take
him back and forth, from St Laurent to St Brieuc, some 48 km each way. In both
Normandy and Brittany, though, their proximity to a possible Allied naval threat was felt.
Radios were confiscated and deposited en masse at each mairie.243 Tree trunks were
requisitioned to be used as part of the growing coastal defenses.244 As in France’s cities,
electricity became sporadic as the war dragged on, particularly in 1943 and 1944. By
May of 1944, immediately prior to the D-Day invasions, Osmont reported that electricity
had gone from sporadic to nonexistent.245 Further west, Guilloux and his fellow Bretons
were subject to nightly blackouts and the omnipresent threat of complete electricity
failure. Typically French, Guilloux felt this hardest at boulangeries, which he says were
particularly pinched by these new restrictions.246 Presumably, he was referring to the fact
that most of the baking for the day is typically done the night before, a practice that had
to be modified without nighttime power sources for the ovens.
Gas and water had also run out in Périers by May 1944.247 Though Marie Louise
Osmont lived through most of the occupation in relative ease, her comfort plummeted in
the months prior to D-Day, as the resident German battalions anxiously anticipated an
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Allied landing. Once again, geography was the determinant here. While Périers and
other Norman towns went completely without water or gas, St Brieuc fared much better.
The mairie issued a decree reducing water consumption.248 Reduction, however, is quite
different form a total unavailability. Guilloux daily expected the city’s gas to run out, but
it never did.249 Though St. Brieuc and other such towns and villages in France’s west
were unquestionably subjected to hardship and deprivations, their distance from any
probable Channel crossings granted them a degree of protection unavailable to those in
more strategically important areas. The Norman coast, with its small town of Périers, is a
prime example of this.
Geography played an enormous role in the civilian experience of the occupation,
but it was not the only determining factor. Social class also seems to have greatly
affected understandings.

Guilloux and Osmont are both excellent examples of this.

Guilloux, by 1940, was already a renowned writer, which afforded him the lifestyle of a
man of leisure. Several times throughout the war he reports not working very much, and
his concern regarding his artistic productivity.250

Never, though, does this lack of

inspiration cause him to have any kind of economic concerns, even in the inflated
markets of occupied France. Osmont, with her family chateau and domestic servants,
was essentially mid-twentieth century country gentility. Her position afforded her the
respectful treatment of the German soldiers who lodged with her, and may well account
for her overall favorable reports of them. It allowed her to maintain a distance from
them, and from the lower classes who found themselves more often thrust into German
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company. Here we have an excellent explanation of Guilloux’s position in judging her
kitchen women sleeping with German soldiers – she simply could not relate their
position.
Social class also goes a long way towards explaining why neither Guilloux nor
Osmont make any lengthy mention of the black market. Perhaps by virtue of their wealth
they did not need to touch it. Or, more likely, they had subordinates to do such dirty
work for them – it is no great leap of logic to assume that Osmont’s cook, a known black
marketeer, used these connections to supply the kitchen of Château Périers.
Conclusion
The experience of rural occupation was far more varied than that in urban centers.
The two greatest determining factors were social class and geography.

Geography

determined the presence or lack of German soldiers, and in those towns and villages
where they were present it determined their numbers.

Geography also played a

significant role in the ability of the countryside to rise and prosper, or to suffer the same
deprivations occurring in the cities.

Fertile soil with diverse agricultural traditions

already in place usually meant relatively light shortages, whereas cultivating a specific
crop, the best example being wine, could often guarantee that the countryside suffered
even more than some cities, where trade routes were more firmly established. It also
introduced certain farmers and producers into the black market, which could lead to great
wealth on some occasions, and restricted others from it.
Social class also played a large role, although a less decisive one than geography.
It dictated how Frenchmen interacted with the occupying powers. Respect was often
reserved for those of higher class. This is especially true in the case of women, as seen
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through the diary of Marie-Louise Osmont, who herself was treated with a distant respect
by the German soldiers she encountered, while her lower class kitchen women were more
often their sexual play things. Social class also determined how individuals engaged, or
did not, with the black market. Osmont illustrates this as well. Rank and prosperity
brought greater access and the means to procure goods even in times of rampant scarcity.
Thus the experience of the average paysan or town dweller is difficult to
determine, as it first demands that we determine what constituted average.

Rural

occupation changed considerably over time and place and thus is much more difficult to
grasp than the occupation in the cities. Variables caused significant differences that make
an average experience almost impossible to obtain.

65

Ch 3. Synthesis
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, rural and urban occupation have been treated as
largely separate entities. They were not. At every point during occupation, France’s
cities and countryside formed a web of mutual dependence and occasionally mutual
enmity. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the links between the two. In doing
so, common threads running through the last two chapters that defined both rural and
urban occupation have been reexamined. These include collaboration and resistance,
social class, city and country tensions, and the controlled economy. A section discussing
historiography has also been included to demonstrate where such an analysis fits in the
larger context of studies of the French occupation.
Though there would seem to be some redundancy inherent in this approach, the
intent is not to repeat those points already made, but to expand on them and place them in
a larger context by connecting the experiences of urban and rural occupation. In so
doing, the links between the two experiences can be explored and expanded.

The

controlled economy and resultant black markets, for instance, are shown to be the most
vital, and most contentious, link between city and country. They simultaneously kept
both groups alive while antagonizing the one against the other. This issue then leads to a
discussion of tensions between the cities and the countryside.
Tensions between the city and the country derived not only from contemporary
struggles, but also from historical precedent. A close examination shows them to have
pre-dated the French Revolution and probably long before. This longterm perspective
aids significantly in tracing the development of this friction as the occupation wore on.
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Viewing the occupation not only in terms of concurrent political and, more importantly,
material circumstances, but also within a larger historical pattern clarifies the quickness
and ease with which such tensions were exacerbated under the occupation.
These conflicts can be related to the issue of social class in the occupation. Some
historians have argued for its inversion under the new rules of occupation, with
respectable, educated people losing out to opportunists.251

Additionally, those well

placed within the lines of production and supply, for instance grocers, butchers or
farmers, had premium access to supplies. Nevertheless, the bulk of historiography bears
out that social class was one of the constants to have survived the occupation largely
untouched. Wealth remained of paramount importance, and even became increasingly so
as scarcity spread.
The interconnected factors that defined the occupation served to illustrate the
links between the urban and rural experiences. Whether these bonds created dependence
between to two or aggravated it varied with both time and place, which determined the
degree to which each factor was present.
Historiography
Most of the historiography concerning life in France between 1940-1944 tends to
focus on one of three things: the Vichy government, collaboration, and resistance. Until
quite recently, the late 1990’s and 2000’s, very little attention was paid to the life of the
average civilian. A cursory acknowledgement was deemed sufficient, recognizing that
most French citizens lived out the occupation under relatively normal, if strained,
conditions, before delving into the underhanded dealings at Vichy or the romantic
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heroism of the resistance. On the one hand, this makes sense. The day-to-day concerns
of civilian life can seem dull next to freedom struggles or illicit Franco-German
partnerships. But this focus ignores the lives of virtually all the French living under
German occupation and obscures the picture that emerges. Most Frenchmen were neither
collaborators nor resistors, and even fewer were directly involved in the Vichy
government. Rather, their lives were plagued by economic hardship and the forced
adjustment to new social realities.
Marshall Philippe Pétain’s government in Vichy France has been extensively and
exhaustively studied. Straddling the line between neutral state and German puppet, it has
been the subject of endless curiosity as political historians have attempted to define its
role, in particular to what degree Vichy was its own master.

Its policies and its

personalities have been combed through for any signs of complicity or foot-dragging that
would indicate submission or sovereignty. The best example of this kind of study is
historian Robert O. Paxton’s seminal work Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order
published in 1972.252 Paxton examines Vichy from every angle, including an analysis of
its myriad influences. He looks into the French politics of the 1930’s for explanations as
to Vichy’s conservative leanings and its political and ideological background. In addition
to examining its policies, Paxton also delves extensively into the unlikely mixture of
personalities who descended on the Auvergnat spa town. While a variety of other works
have attempted the same approach, Paxton remains the benchmark for historians of
France under German occupation.
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By far the most dominant feature of the prevailing historiography, though, is not
Vichy and its policies and players, but rather a pendulum swing between two visions of
Occupied France: the nation of collaborators and the nation of resistors.253 Historian
Henry Rousso’s influential work The Vichy Syndrome traces and explains the shifts in
attitudes towards the occupation between 1944 and the present.254 His study traces
historiography as it has affected and been affected by these shifts. According to Rousso’s
classification, postwar memory of Vichy can be divided into three parts. From 19441954, there were the immediate after effects, what he refers to as the mourning phase.255
The war was still roughly contemporary, and its direct impacts still reverberated – the
economy had not yet rebounded and France’s Fourth Republic was floundering. The
second phase began in 1954 and lasted until 1971, during which what Rousso terms
“resistancialism” took hold.256 In this period historians focused on the nation of resistors,
giving rise to the Gaullist myth and the romantic image of a nation of resistors. Rousso’s
classification is too restrictive and ignores the fact that the focus on resistance predates
1954 and, indeed, even predates the end of the war. At the Liberation of Paris on August
25, 1944, a self-congratulatory General Charles de Gaulle shared his feelings with the
people of Paris, saying that France had “liberated itself.”257 Clearly the story of French
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Resistance was already being propagated. In the immediate aftermath of the war its myth
was already being celebrated.258
In fact, resistance was never universal and the contention that France was
responsible for its own liberation is a dubious one. Only a small percentage of the adult
population ever actively participated in the resistance. In light of the national tragedy
they had suffered through defeat and occupation, though, the French clung fiercely to the
idea of a nationwide, collective resistance. It provided a support system, an emotional
buffer against the prospect of contemplating what was, in truth, closer to national tragedy
than glory. It became a “quasi-sacred symbol” of eternal France.259
By 1971 though, the notion of pure republican resistance had run its course – the
pendulum swung the other way.260

Rousso refers to this as “the return of the

repressed.”261 As if to apologize for overemphasizing resistance and the glories of France,
the focus now shifted to her faults.

The nation of resistors became the nation of

collaborators. Suppressed memories like the complicity of the Vichy government in the
deportation of France’s Jews and the eager aid of leading industrialists came flooding
back. France was now thought guilty of creating her own misery, the counter myth to the
glories of the resistancialism.
Two things in particular can be pointed to as the cause for this change. The first
was 1968.262 1968 in France was a tumultuous year of student rallies and protests. A
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new generation of French citizens rose up against “a certain type of society and therefore,
implicitly, [against] a certain vision of its history.”263 Charles de Gaulle was forced out
of public life and the entire face of France changed in the wake of this new, liberal
challenge. The second change to be born out of 1968 was a more direct attack on
France’s wartime past. In 1972 director Marcel Ophuls released the film The Sorrow and
the Pity, a documentary look at daily life in the southern city of Clermont-Ferrand,
ostensibly a city representative of the occupation throughout France.264 The film was a
departure from the norm – de Gaulle was notably absent, with the emphasis instead on a
wide variety of ordinary people, all with different ideologies resulting in different choices
during the war. Ophul’s vision of the occupation was much darker and more nuanced
than his predecessors, arguing that no one escaped the occupation with their innocence
intact. This vision set the tone for the new emphasis on collaboration.
True collaboration, like resistance, was a rare phenomenon. The France of the
early 1970s’ was in turmoil, plagued by colonial crises and facing the loss of de Gaulle,
who had been the foremost promoter of resistancialism since its inception. The shift
towards emphasizing collaboration reflects these issues and is comparable to the idea of
self-flagellation – the bad and cowardly French had been the national undoing and
therefore the contemporary French should pay.
Several works written between the 1970’s and early 1990’s attempted to bridge
the gap, discussing collaboration and resistance in conjunction.

This was a major

historiographical shift, as it recognized that the two could exist side by side and indeed,
even influenced one another a great deal. Werner Rings Life With the Enemy provides an
263
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analysis of the interplay between collaboration and resistance not only in France but
throughout Occupied Europe.265 H.R. Kedward was the author of several works during
this period, some of which treat the two paths as interrelated, and some in isolation.266
At its most extreme, the nation of resistors/nation of collaborators dichotomy is
believed to have erupted into a guerre franco-française, simmering low-level social strife
that in 1944 became a veritable civil war.267 This is a serious contention and worth
exploration. It is clear that the tumultuous months before and after Liberation in 1944
saw a not insignificant amount of violence. This was concentrated between French
resistance forces and ideological collaborators, in particular the Milice, a paramilitary
force doggedly faithful to Vichy, and often to the Nazis as well. Indisputably, 1944 was
the most dangerous period during the war to be in France.268 However the infrequency
and limited documentation of violence suggests sporadic anarchy and isolated violence
between ideological extremists on both sides rather than civil war. Civilian involvement
outside these guerrilla bands was very limited.

Given the small number of both

collaborators and resistors and the general exhaustion with the war by 1944, anything
approaching a civil war would have been extremely unlikely. Additionally, it would have
warranted greater documentation, whereas the festering tension between the Milice and
the resistors passed largely under the radar.
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Neither resistance nor collaboration was ever widespread enough to define the
experience of all of France, and yet each in turn has been treated as such. In recent years,
interest has grown concerning the experience of ordinary civilians. To that end, regional
studies have emerged, detailing life in diverse areas of France. In 2003 English historian
Robert Gildea published Marianne in Chains, a study of the civilian experience in what
he terms France’s heartland, the Loire.269 He focuses on several different aspects of
occupation – the role of the Catholic Church, the relationship between maquis groups and
the local communities – all through the prism of civilians living in the Loire region. He
mixes facts with individual stories to illustrate and prove his larger points. He argues for
the continuing divisive nature of differing interpretations of the occupation.

These

interpretations, which might result in mere disagreements, he claims, have such a divisive
force because of the vested interests caught up in them, particularly by those looking to
protect their own or their families past.270
Shannon Fogg published a similar work in 2009, entitled The Politics of Everyday
Life in Vichy France.271 Fogg focuses on the Limousin, a region she says she chose for
its ordinariness – with a few remarkable exceptions, it provides an excellent case study of
Occupied France, particularly in terms of the social tensions between town and country
wrought by food shortages.272 Like Gildea, she mixes facts with stories, allowing
characters and their contexts to come to life. Her primary concern in the book is “placing
political events within the context of the material situation rather than vice versa [to]
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highlight the way in which the public’s habituation to illegality in daily life eroded the
Vichy government’s authority and legitimacy over an extended period of time.”273
According to her analysis, the politics of occupation followed logically from the material
circumstances thrust upon France’s citizens.
These emerging regional studies have been accompanied by several works
providing a more general examination of the civilian’s lot in all of Occupied France. The
best examples of this are written by Richard Vinen, Ian Ousby, and Philippe Burrin.
Richard Vinen is an English historian teaching at the University of London, who in 2006
published The Unfree French: Life Under the Occupation.274 Vinen’s discussion of the
civilian is extremely informative and seems to offer something about every aspect of the
occupation.
power.

The particular focus, though, is civilian interaction with the occupying

Civilians are divided into several subcategories to provide the most

comprehensive picture: Jews, women, POWs, youths, and marketers, to name only the
most prominent. The picture that comes out is stark, but not totally so – Vinen allows for
the complexity and disparity that ultimately characterized the occupation, arguing that the
relationship between occupier and occupied was constantly in flux and greatly variable.
In 1998 Ian Ousby published Occupation: The Ordeal of France 1940-1944.275
With a cover image that superimposes a swastika over the Eiffel Tower, Ousby goes for
shock and achieves much of his purpose. He seems primarily concerned with showing
the darkness inherent in occupation – where other authors remain vague he is explicit,
once referring to “respectable folks…braining the pigeons in the public parks” of Paris in
273
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their hunger.276 He presents the occupation as it developed chronologically. By dividing
it into three sections, Ousby is then able to analyze its progression. His writing is
especially memorable, as it is peppered with obscure and surprising facts that serve to
color and bring to life France in the early 1940’s, from the braining of pigeons to the
“anti-Semitic diatribes” of Coco Chanel.277 One of the primary distinctions between
Ousby and other scholars, though, is his condemnatory tone – though he respects the
adaptability of the French evident in le système D, a certain disdain for their eagerness to
simply live through the occupation with little thought to outside events provides an
undercurrent to the book.
Philippe Burrin is one of the few French historians to have emerged in recent
years, as interest has turned towards civilians.

His 1996 work France Under the

Germans: Collaboration and Compromise was one of the first to offer a national
perspective on civilians.278 Unlike Ousby and Vinen, though, Burrin is more interested in
special groups of the population, often unrepresentative of the civilian experience as a
whole. This includes discussions of captains of industry, intellectuals, artists, ad-hoc
militias, and the Catholic Church. He also devotes a very large section to the role of the
Vichy government in shaping the occupation as experienced by its citizens. His states
goal in writing is to provide context and origins for the most commonly held attitude
during the war – that of simply trying to get through.279
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Several studies have focused on the occupation in Paris alone. This is perhaps the
most interesting, if least representative, kind of study. Paris, though certainly its cultural
center and heart, is anything but typical of France. Many of these works look specifically
at the arts and popular culture as they were affected by occupation – for example Ian
Buruma’s Occupied Paris: The Sweet and The Cruel and Frederic Spotts The Shameful
Peace: How French Artists and Intellectuals Survived the Nazi Occupation. 280 Both of
these works focus specifically on the artists and intelligentsia of Paris as they adapted and
occasionally collaborated their way through the war.

Buruma’s work also looks at

Parisian culture as a whole, documenting the strange element of normalcy that came from
the mixture of scarcity and luxury that characterized Occupied Paris.
Jean Dutourd’s Au Bon Beurre provides a very different picture of Paris.281 A
novel published shortly after the war, Au Bon Beurre details the meteoric rise of a family
owning a Parisian creamery, as they successfully negotiate the black market. Dutourd’s
work is an indictment of profiteering hidden in a work of fiction that accurately reflects
the social stratification of wartime Paris. The potential pitfalls of any of these works,
however, is to view Paris or Parisian life as typical of that elsewhere in France, when in
fact its unique position afforded it an entirely unique experience.
All historiography of the French occupation and any discussions thereof are
inevitably colored by the subject’s sensitivity. Gildea attributes this to a national inability
to confront the recent past, saying “the French have never faced up to their wartime past
in any sustained and systematic way. Much is at stake ideologically and politically in the
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interpretation of the Occupation period, and the rival views are propagated and
defended.”282 Coming to terms with four years of foreign occupation has proven difficult
for the nation responsible for articulating and subsequently defending the Rights of Man.
The role of the French in the years of occupation could have ramifications for France’s
history and contemporary society.
Controlled Economy
An important aspect of the German occupation of France was the controlled
economy.

Evidence affirming its importance emerges from sources in the city and

countryside alike and it appears to have been the defining feature most responsible for
linking the two. It was first introduced almost immediately after the armistice in June
1940 as a means of harnessing France’s economy to aid the German war machine.
Superfluous businesses and factories were closed down, the better to direct energies
towards those industries which could further the war aims. Rubber production at the
Michelin Company outside of Clermont-Ferrand, for example, was maximized,
facilitating the constant supplies needed for tires and tank treads.283 By late June 1942
some 1500 factories had been closed in the Occupied Zone, deemed nonessential and
therefore distracting to the war effort.284

A large number of these manufactured

household goods – ceramics, furniture and the like, none of it particularly helpful to the
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Third Reich. Instead airplane construction became one of the foremost leaders of French
industry, as production multiplied by almost thirty between 1938 and 1944.285
In an ironic twist, this constrained and controlled market resuscitated France’s
failing economy and poured much needed funds back into production. The worldwide
Depression of the 1930’s had hit France later and slower than other countries, but its
effects were no less palpable – one historian describes it as a “slow paralysis” striking the
nation.286 This virtual stagnation lasted throughout the tumultuous 1930’s. During the
invasion of May and June 1940, though, what reparations had been made were devastated
by the accompanying anarchy and chaos that plagued the nation, down to its economic
functions, in the absence of a decisive governing body. German orders and demands
allowed France’s agricultural and industrial markets to revivify.287 One particularly good
indication of this change are the labor patterns within France. At the outset of the war
and in its early years, unemployment was common and even termed “vast” by one
historian.288 Those most susceptible were those working in superfluous industries shut
down or limited by the authorities, as well as people already marginal to society,
particularly women, foreigners, and Jews. By 1942, unemployment eased, and by 1944
there was a veritable labor shortage.289
Requisitions, known to the French as les ravitaillements, were the most important,
and most felt, feature of the controlled economy. As previously discussed, they could
extend to everything from food products – which were most common – to lumber, coal,
285
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horses, or leather.290

Simultaneously providing for the needs of France and the

occupying German forces, as well as those goods requisitioned and sent on to Germany
or Italy, proved a strain on French resources and often resulted in shortages, as
competition for goods skyrocketed. As also previously discussed, the solution devised
for this problem was a system of rationing.
Rationing was the natural extension of a controlled economy and meant that
control extended to consumption. By determining who could consume how much of any
given product, rationing was intended to maximize on limited availabilities so that, even
with the heightened wartime competition for goods, everyone was guaranteed some
portion of France’s production.

Unfortunately this proved largely unsuccessful and

shortages, rather than equal distribution, were more often the result of requisitioning.
These shortages varied in intensity and duration, depending on time and place.
Substitutes and additional supplies were more widely and readily available in the
countryside, closer to the original production point. No travel was necessary to obtain
goods already close at hand, and the relationships necessary for trade (legal and
extralegal) were already likely to be in place.

Monocultural versus polycultural

traditions, already alluded to, also had a significant effect on how a region weathered
times of scarcity.291 Some regions of France were simply better equipped to sustain
themselves than others. The Limousin, for example, which historian Shannon Fogg
chose to study for its alleged ordinariness, did not specialize in any particular product, but
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produced mixed agriculture and thus fared much better, longer than many nearby
southern provinces.292
Primary sources are revealing as to the disparities that emerged, in particular
between urban centers and the countryside. Alfred Fabre-Luce and Henri Drouot, in
Paris and Dijon respectively, each discuss the prices and availabilities of foodstuffs
virtually to the exclusion of all else. They tracked their local markets with an almost
obsessive concern. Their journals are filled with the changing price of vegetables and the
beleaguered search for potatoes. Marie-Louise Osmont of Périers, Normandy, and Louis
Guilloux of St. Brieuc, Brittany, by contrast, practically never mention the markets.
Their testimonies are instead a record of their changing feelings and those experienced by
the larger society around them.
Paris and Dijon are both located in fertile, strongly polycultural regions, Ile-deFrance and Burgundy.

Thus Fabre-Luce and Drouot were not suffering because

production was focused in the wrong direction as would have been the case in a
monocultural region (for example the area around Nîmes, which specializes in wine, ran
into shortages as early as summer 1940), but rather due to their urban environment.293
Cities lacked the direct access naturally available to those in the countryside and suffered
as a result.
Disparities between cities and country were very real. In 1946, with France still
reeling from the effects of occupation but beginning to make slow steps towards
recovery, the average daily caloric intake in rural regions was close to 3000 calories. In
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Paris it was 2335, and in Marseilles 2242.294 Specific examples illustrate this disparity
even better – whereas the average daily intake of butter in rural areas was some 27 grams,
in Paris it was only 13 grams and in Marseilles 2.3.295

This shows not only the

differences based on population, but also based on polycultural versus monocultural
traditions. Marseilles, located in the monocultural south, recovered much slower than
Paris, in the fertile and prolific north.
The black market was the system developed to combat scarcity and meet
demands. In doing so, it forged the strongest connection between the countryside and the
cities. Interdependence intertwined the two entities at unprecedented levels as foreign
imports became nonexistent and a reliance on domestic production and distribution
became essential. City-dwellers rediscovered country cousins, with whom they began
barter relationships, agricultural provisions for manufactured goods, or sometimes based
on the promise of future payment.296 Many of these relationships were not strictly
familial, and some were even invented entirely. These colis familiaux combined with the
trains des haricots to supplement the meager diet that often confronted Frenchmen living
in towns and cities, which would otherwise have had only the legal markets to rely on.
Ironically, pursuing goods through extralegal means often meant that legally
obtained supplies were much harder to find and, as a result, more expensive. It became
cyclical – because available supplies were limited at legal markets in cities, France’s
urban populations began scouring the countryside directly, bicycling to nearby locations
and taking the train to more distant ones. They also developed or strengthened existing
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ties to those in the countryside in a position to supply them with goods, most notably in
the form of colis familiaux, packages sent ostensibly between families to supplement the
caloric intake of those living in the cities. They were also willing to pay very high prices.
City dwellers thus enabled the black market to flourish, and even to overtake the regular,
legal market. Since urbanites were willing to come to them and pay high prices, farmers
and other suppliers were able to benefit from the black market far more than they did at
government-regulated prices. Thus more and more goods were diverted into extralegal
channels, causing even those who had initially relied on legal means of obtaining goods
to resort to the black market, thereby perpetuating the cycle.
City/Country Tensions
The development of the black market displayed vividly the natural imbalance
between France’s cities and countryside. While defeat followed by foreign occupation
did not in itself cause these tensions, it exacerbated what already simmered beneath the
surface of French society. Long before even the French Revolution, urban and rural
France had been at odds. Though perhaps close geographically, the two were more often
worlds apart – each viewed the other with a mix of hostility, curiosity and distrust.
This persistent tension occasionally bordered on a paranoid – even xenophobic –
fear. The Vanishing Children of Paris written by Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, relates
how this could occur. 297 The book recounts an episode in Paris in 1750, when reports of
children being arrested by civil authorities circulated throughout the city.

Paranoia

quickly devolved into virtually citywide rioting, as the rumors proved to be at least
partially substantiated. The episode is revealing of a prevailing, and pervasive, bias held
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by city dwellers against their provincial neighbors. As suspicions were cast everywhere
and misgivings rose, “the most entrenched prejudices re-emerged...[The] fear of seeing
an influx of vagrants and delinquents into the city was exacerbated.”298 Widely feared
roving gangs of anarchic peasants were suspected to be the orchestrators behind the
perceived threat. Indeed, the main reason that the incident provoked such a response
from the Parisians was that it was not the roving, migrant population – paysans who
routinely wandered in and out of the city looking for work in times of scarcity – but
rather the children of established urban citizens who were targeted.299 Outsiders, in
particularly the barbarous, uncouth peasantry, were the ultimate threat.

The lines

between city and country had already been firmly drawn, and to the city dwellers, it was
clear whose children were more important.
This inbred suspicion of outsiders came to play a large role in the Revolution of
1789. Eminent Revolutionary historian Georges Lefebvre traces the outbreak of the
Great Fear in the rural provinces in his work The Great Fear of 1789. 300 Though
circumstances obviously differed considerably between 1789 and the 1940’s, there are a
surprising number of comparisons that can be drawn based on his findings. The most
important, and most striking, of these are the festering tensions between the cities and the
countryside. During the occupation, there was a persistent belief held by city folk that
farmers and their country neighbors were hoarding supplies, keeping the bulk of the
goods for themselves. This belief was nothing new. At the Estates-General in 1789,
many of the representatives believed that the peasants were not to be trusted, that theirs
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was a “pretended poverty…and behind the rags, [they led] a peaceful life, often
comfortable, sometimes even affluent.”301 It was assumed that farmers were jealously
hoarding supplies.302 And the misgivings went both ways. France’s rural residents
assumed that brigands were coming from the city’s to menace their lands and crops.303
These suspicions always carried with them a kernel of truth, which allowed them
to persist through centuries. In the Revolutionary period, peasants did want to protect
their crops and keep enough to feed their families and hopefully turn a profit – hence the
image of hoarding. Those in the cities saw that, while they might lack bread if it did not
make it to the marketplace, the peasants producing the wheat had plenty and they wanted
a share of the production. Eventually this even became the job of the Revolutionary
Army, formed in 1792 to scour the countryside for hoarded supplies for the deprived
citizenry. The distance between roving bandits and the Revolutionary Army is not a
large leap either. Little had changed by the 1940’s. Accusations of hoarding were still
hurled at farmers. Farmers and others in supply positions still regarded city dwellers
scouring for goods with barely veiled hostility.
Urban and rural tensions, then, are ancient and ingrained. Given a successful crop
and the ability to trade, it seems that most country and city-folk were willing to cooperate
in what was a mutually beneficial relationship, based on supply and demand.

The

uncertainty of the crop, or perhaps more importantly the uncertain ability to access it,
however, inevitably led to divisions and mounting social tensions, whether in the
eighteenth century or the twentieth.
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This can be read, as in The Vanishing Children of Paris, as hostility towards
outsiders. Whether country-to-city or city-to-country, both cases illustrate a population
that feels that what is rightfully and necessarily theirs is threatened by unfamiliar people.
An excellent example of this comes from the classic children’s story, Stone Soup.304 In
the story, three soldiers are trudging through the countryside back from war. They are
hungry and tired when they approach a village. The villagers, seeing the soldiers draw
near and fearing strangers, hide all of their supplies and when the soldiers ask for food,
they refuse, saying there was simply nothing left. Suspecting they had been duped, the
soldiers turn the tables, declaring instead that they should all make stone soup. The
villagers, impressed that soup could come from a stone, are swayed by the soldiers and
slowly empty their stores of supplies into the soup, eventually creating a feast. Though a
children’s tale, Stone Soup is revelatory of the ingrained distrust of outsiders prevalent
throughout France. It also provides grounds for this inherent suspicion – the soldiers do
trick the villagers into giving away their supplies, after all. The most important aspect of
Stone Soup though, is that it reinforces the tradition of distrust and illustrates its
omnipresence.
The city reigned victorious over the countryside for much of the nineteenth
century, and seemed to reach its zenith under the metropolitan Third Republic. France’s
republic was urban, intellectual, and interested in progressing alongside of the rest of the
industrial world. Industry required dense populations, which led to the development of
urban centers in areas that had not existed before, and the expansion of those that had.
Intellectuals flocked to cities as the hubs of learning – newspapers and universities were
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almost invariably based in urban centers. Paris, in particular, became the center not just
of French culture, but of world culture, as the arts reached new heights along the banks of
the Seine. The city held the attractions of the modern world, of progress, while the
countryside came to represent the old, agriculturally dependent world of pre-imperial
days.
In the tumultuous 1930’s though, this vision of France began to be called into
question. Urbanism had not spared France from the effects of the Depression. In 1931 it
hit France, sending it spiraling into poverty and chaos, along with the rest of the Western
world.305 Nor was France exempt from the rising tensions in Europe, as fascism and
communism came to a head and forced the hardening of party lines on both sides. Added
to this was a mounting fear of depopulation in France, whose birth rate was far below that
of its neighbors, most notably Germany.306

Together these factors gave rise to

peasantism, a movement that began in the 1930’s. Founded in 1928, the Parti Agraire et
Paysan Française began to gain political power as the Depression threw light on these
mounting issues and gave voice to the resentments of France’s rural populations.307
Thus when Vichy came to power in June 1940 – a political event that has been
called by many revenge against the Popular Front – the landed peasant was already on the
rise. Vichy’s policy was aimed at continuing and expanding this trend. Travail, famille,
patrie replaced the traditional liberté, égalité, fraternité.308 Vichy capitalized on the
image of the peasant to promote the virtues of the country at the expense of the urban rot
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and corruption of the Third Republic. Vichy’s endorsement of the peasant went beyond
lip service, to actually offering subsidies to families willing to restore and revitalize
abandoned farmland.309 Hearty peasant families were allegedly more likely to have
children, saving France’s aging population while simultaneously providing new
agricultural workers.310 Returning to the soil was meant to simultaneously revitalize
France and gain the support of the French people, by returning to the traditions that had
originally made France grand.
Like most of Vichy’s policies, however, re-aggrandizing the countryside failed.
For one thing, it failed to win over the hearts and minds of its target audience, many of
whom remained personally loyal to Marshall Pétain, but hostile to the government as a
whole, including its policies.311 The countryside, particularly in the Occupied Zone
farther away from the influence of Vichy, did not buy into its rhetoric and as
disillusionment with the government grew, so too did disenchantment with its policies.
More importantly, Vichy’s need to get food from the reluctant countryside to fill
requisition quotas put the two seriously at odds.312 A declaration of production was
required by law, so that government officials could accurately predict and fill requisition
orders, but in response farmers simply took to concealing how much they had or were
likely to produce so that official government quotas for collection were set unnaturally
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low.313 The vested interest of the farmers lay in thwarting attempts at official seizure,
thus holding back more supplies for themselves and for illegal sales.
To a certain degree the countryside did indeed reach its ascendancy during the
occupation, and unquestionably at the expense of the cities. As has been discussed
extensively, the countryside played a crucial role in France’s domestic economy, as the
country turned inwards during the war years. Lacking access to most foreign trade, local
production took center stage as it had in the pre-industrial world. This exacerbated preexistent tensions with cities, used to ready access to goods, both foreign and domestic.
Competition for scarce resources increased these tensions as the occupation continued.
The two groups “were thrown together by the dependence of the townspeople on extra
food from the countryside, and this caused resentment to flow” in both directions.314
Tensions similar to those described by Georges Lefebvre at the outbreak of the French
Revolution took hold. Urbanites thought that those in the countryside were selfishly
hoarding extra supplies. Those in the countryside, farmers in particular, felt menaced by
city dwellers, looking for supplies they were not always willing (or able) to share.
Nonetheless, the two became increasingly dependent on each other. The countryside,
obviously, fed the cities and kept them at least somewhat nourished through the
occupation. Supplies might ebb and flow, but the connection between supplier and
demander remained constant. City dwellers, in turn, paid for the rise of the countryside.
Their depleting resources financed what some scholars have painted as the revenge of the
countryside. While they grew poor in search of increasingly scarce goods, farmers and
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suppliers purportedly profited, storing the large sums of cash they accumulated until after
the war.
Although the countryside did profit off of the increased needs of the cities, it is
important not to over-exaggerate the positive effect this had on rural France. As the cost
of food rose, so too did the cost of everything else. Fuel prices soared, as did the price of
other essentials – fertilizers or mechanical equipment like tractors, for example.315
Though the average price that goods could be sold at increased an incredible 216%
between 1939 and 1943, the price of goods necessary to facilitate agricultural production
rose even higher – some 308%.316
“Presence and Absence”317
Economics were not the only source of tension between the countryside and
cities. A majority of the French prisoners of war were from rural areas.318 Of the
roughly 1.5 million POWs, 450,000 were either farmers or otherwise involved in
agriculture.319

This left France’s rural citizens with a bitter taste in their mouths,

imagining themselves to have paid the heaviest costs of the war, that they alone had
suffered for all of France. Given that a large portion of France’s population was urban,
this sense of disproportionately was not entirely unfounded.
The absence plagued the countryside with a physical void, a dearth of young men.
This void had inevitable effects on production, which had difficulty picking up the slack
demanded by the localizing nature of the occupation when integral workers were absent –
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just as foreign imports dropped off, 450,000 valuable members of the labor force also
disappeared. This absence should not be over-exaggerated – compared to the emptiness
wrought by the First World War, 1.5 million men missing nationwide did not compare to
the massive depopulation that erased virtually an entire generation.
POWs were not the only Frenchmen to go missing, although they were perhaps
the most notable. When German authorities saw that mass executions (unsurprisingly)
deteriorated relations between the occupier and the occupied and made France reluctant
to collaborate economically, they switched to a policy of mass deportations instead.320
This policy was specifically designed to target already marginalized members of society,
those that Germany described as the common enemy: Jews and communists, or the
“Jewish Bolsheviks” as they were referred to, to instill a sense that they were working in
collusion.321 By targeting these groups, the majority of Frenchmen were left largely
unscathed and therefore more likely to remain complacent, even if begrudgingly so.
Eventually it was the manner in which these deportations were conducted that could not
help but draw widespread public attention – specifically the deportation of children to
supposed work camps.322
While the countryside suffered from absence and those on society’s margins bore
the brunt of contentions, the cities balked under a new presence. Urban centers were the
hubs of Germans in France. Paris in particular served as headquarters for the German
military command, under Otto von Stulpnagel, and after 1942, his cousin Carl-Heinrich
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von Stulpnagel.323 Situated on Avenue Kléber in Paris’ wealthy 16th arrondissement gave
them a privileged experience of and access to the city.324 High-ranking officers were not
the only Germans in France; rather soldiers and officers alike “clustered around ports,
railways and main roads” of France’s cities. The administration, akin to a colonial
government, was such that at least some German presence was assured in every city in
Occupied France, although the actual size of this presence varied greatly depending on
the relative importance of any given city.325 As France’s largest city and Germany’s
local command headquarters, Paris naturally had the highest population of Germans –
40,000 troops as of 1940.326 Soldiers were not the only addition to the population –
imported labor worked both ways, and some 80,000 German civilians were brought into
France for construction projects.327 Their most notable achievement was the Atlantic
Wall, designed to impede seaborne Allied invasions.
The magnitude of German presence hinged on two important factors: time and
geography. In December 1941 there were 100,000 German troops in France; by spring
1942 that number had dropped to 40,000; by spring 1944 it had risen to a million men.328
Soldiers were needed initially to ensure that occupation ran smoothly at the beginning.
By 1942 these soldiers were gravely needed on the Eastern Front and divisions in France
were often older men, less physically capable of contributing actively to the war effort in
the east. In the spring of 1944, the Germans were preparing for an anticipated Allied
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landing, and therefore began to mass unprecedented levels of troops in France,
particularly in the north and along the coast.
At any given time, though, these troops were in different areas. Most towns and
villages only saw German troops at the beginning and end of the war, as in the interim
they had little cause to move around the country. Some places, however, were subject to
continual heavy German presence regardless of their population size, by virtue of their
location. The case of Périers, Normandy has already been used to illustrate this. It
occupied a strategic potential landing point for Allied invasions, and thus acquired an
importance that had nothing to do with the size of its population or whether or not it
served as an administrative center. A comparably sized town in the heart of France
would never have experienced the same kind of presence.
An interesting aspect of the German presence, though, is that as time wore on the
French became almost immune to it, at least in the realm of the public world. Ironically,
this growing immunity developed at the same time as the oppression of the occupation
intensified, in particular after the end of 1941.329 Historian Ian Ousby describes the
phenomenon saying, “And so the alien presence, increasingly hate and feared in private,
could seem so permanent that, in public places where daily life went on, it was taken for
granted. It grew invisible.”330
Collaboration/Resistance
Ostensibly, it would seem simple to define collaboration or resistance. Placed in
the context of occupation France, though, only the most overt instances of either are truly
easy to define. Particularly in terms of collaboration, motivation heightens the issue and
329
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increases the difficulty of making clear divisions. The problems of arriving at formal,
fixed definitions for either term reflects the changing landscape they occupied as the war
progressed and opinions changed.

Collaboration and resistance were fluid and

changeable and perhaps the most important aspects of defining them, motive and intent,
are virtually impossible to come by, particularly in the light of hindsight.
Thus far resistance and collaboration have been examined in terms of the forms
they could take – what a collaborator might do in a factory in the banlieues outside Paris,
or who might become a resistor in the backwoods of rural France.331 It is important to
understand, however, that choices to resist or collaborate were not made in a vacuum.
They were dependent on external, political events. Sometimes it is easy to forget that
while Frenchmen and women went about their daily lives for five years, war was raging
elsewhere in Europe, and, indeed, most of the world. These events, though far removed
geographically, carried great importance and dictated the directions that individuals in
France chose.
When the resistance movement began in the summer and fall of 1940, it was little
more than a sporadic, unorganized movement. It had little chance of having any real
affect on the occupying forces. “Resistance requires some hope, and until late in the
war” there was very little to be had.332 The resistance movement stalled getting off the
ground in 1940 for a number of reasons. Much of the strength and organization of later
resistance movements came from French communists, but in 1940, the French
Communist Party was in tatters. To begin with, it had been officially outlawed in
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September 1939.333 Leadership, then, was in question, and officially the party did not
even exist to mount any effective resistance. Far more debilitating, though, was the
rampant confusion within the party caused by the Nazi-Soviet Pact made weeks earlier, in
August 1939.334 The treaty, which pledged neutrality between the two nations should
either be attacked by a third party, bewildered and concerned all of Europe’s communists.
Since its birth, National Socialism had been the natural enemy of communists. Now that
the once hostile groups had become cordial (or at least non-aggressive), communists in
France, and throughout Europe, did not know whether to treat Germany as friend or foe.
The situation became even more complex for French communists in May and June 1940
when Germany invaded – was it right to fight and protect the nation? Or follow the
dictates from Moscow and remain passive in the face of German aggression? This
widespread confusion bred inactivity and effectively kept the communists out of the
resistance movement until late June 1941.

On June 22, Nazi Germany launched

Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, thus clarifying the position of
Europe’s communist community, as the uneasy bedfellows returned to their natural state
of mutual enmity.
Not only communists, but the rest of France’s political Left, the natural leaders of
any resistance movement, had been left devastated and in disarray after the turbulent
1930’s.335 First the Depression hit and the global economy was in shambles.336 The
Popular Front, a coalition government embracing many left-leaning groups including
socialists and communists, stepped in to take the lead of the Third Republic in 1934. Led
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by the widely respected Leon Blum, the government was beset with problems from its
inception. The economic crisis brought unemployment and labor wages, which resulted
in a massive general strike in June 1936.337 When the Spanish Civil War broke out a
month later it posed a moral dilemma for the nation, but in particular the Popular Front
government.

Eventually a course of non-intervention was determined, but this was

deemed counterintuitive to the liberal principles of the government, and only further
undermined its authority.338 When their finances began to deteriorate in 1937, there was
little the coalition government could do, and they were voted out of power a year later.339
When the conservative, rightist Vichy government founded l’Etat Français, it was the
final nails in the coffin of the Popular Front.340
Leftist uncertainty was not the only stumbling block to mounting an effective
resistance. Vichy presented an additional puzzle, especially in the Free Zone. With the
Vichy government advocating collaboration and the jurisdiction not yet ironed out
between Vichy and German authorities in the earliest days of Occupation, it could be
difficult to know for sure who you were resisting.341 Did an act taken against the
Germans necessarily put you in conflict with Pétain and Vichy? Prior to 1942 this
presented a large obstacle to resistors in the Free Zone. In the Occupied Zone, and
particularly in the Forbidden Zone, these lines were more clearly drawn. Historian
Richard Cobb suggests that, especially in the case of the Nord Pas de Calais in the
Forbidden Zone, their experience of the war made the necessary moral position clear
337

Jackson, The Popular Front in France, 9.
Jackson, The Popular Front in France, 10.
339
Jackson, The Popular Front in France, 11.
340
Sweets, Choices in Vichy France, 31. L’état Français, or the French State, was the
name given to the government, to disassociate it from the Third Republic.
341
Paxton, Vichy France, 38.
338

95

early: “Patriotism came easily to a frontier region always the first to experience the fire of
war and invasion.”342 After facing the brunt of German invasion and occupation in both
World War One and Two, even being virtually isolated from the rest of France under a
military governorship, the Forbidden Zone’s position was clear.
While the case for resisting may have been weak in most parts of France in 1940,
the case for collaborating virtually made itself. The German victory in June 1940 had
shocked everyone, including the Germans, in its speed and totality.

One historian

observed that, “In 1919 the Germans attacked Verdun for ten months without taking
it…in 1940 the Germans took Verdun in little more than a day.”343 Everywhere France
lost quickly and totally, decimating what little morale the French had possessed going
into the war. Defeat was almost a relief when it came. “The most important feature of
the French defeat was that it left much of the population with a sense that it still had
something to lose.”344 It instilled the French with a sense of German invincibility and
their own ineffectiveness. For many, the only logical thing to do in the face of such
defeat was to return to normal life.
Returning to normalcy, however, was not as black and white as it might seem.
“The most elementary promptings of normalcy in the summer of 1940, the urge to return
to home and job, started many Frenchmen down a path of everyday complicity that led
gradually and eventually to active assistance in German measures.”345 Rebuilding roads,
reopening factories were all aids to the German occupation of France. While France may
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have wanted to do these things for herself, the knowledge that they were simultaneously
aiding the occupying power was inescapable. In 1940, though, collaboration seemed to
many like the best, most realistic option. It was undoubtedly only a matter of time before
Britain fell and virtually all Europe was under German dominion. Then France would
receive preferential treatment in the new European order that would arise for having
submitted first and quietly.346 Collaboration was not only expedient, it was advisable.
As the war changed though, so too did ideas regarding the advisability of
collaboration. During the summer and fall of 1940, collaboration was at its most popular.
From there, it began slipping. The decline was neither constant nor steady, but by late
1942 the tide had turned decisively from collaboration and towards resistance. Domestic
and foreign events both played a part in this shift. Abroad, the German army had begun
to experience setbacks – the possibility that it was not invincible began to seem real.
German soldiers suffered tremendous losses at the hands of the Soviets at Stalingrad, in
what was becoming a bloody war of attrition. Axis forces advancing in North Africa had
been stopped at El Alamein in a decisive move by the Allied powers. Weaknesses began
to show in the once impregnable Germans hide.
At the same time, the situation within France itself was growing increasingly dire.
In November 1942, the German army in France launched Case Anton, which completed
the invasion and occupation begun in 1940. The Free Zone joined the Occupied Zone
and all of France was under German dominion. 1942 and the total occupation also saw a
marked change in German policies in France. In spring 1942, the job of policing France
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was transferred from the regular army to the SS.347 1942 also saw the beginning and the
high-water mark of the deportation of France’s Jews to camps in the east, including the
infamous round-ups that occurred in Paris in July.348
Indeed, 1942 can be pinpointed as the turning point in the French occupation. “A
crude graph of French public opinion from 1940 to 1944 would show nearly universal
acceptance of Marshal Pétain in June 1940 and nearly universal acceptance of General de
Gaulle in August 1944” – the turning point was 1942.349 1942 was the year when an
organized, rural resistance truly began to take hold.350 In 1940 and 1941, resistance had
been an individual and desperate act, built on symbolism rather than efficacy. It had
occurred mainly in the cities where occupation rankled earlier and harder.
Throughout 1942 and 1943, though, despite the fact that most French citizens
were turning against Vichy, the resistance movement was still a small, relatively limited
group – “people were more concerned with the hardships caused by rationing.”351
Approval for and sympathy with the resistance grew at a much faster rate than new
recruits joined. Disliking Vichy or disapproving of collaboration did not in itself create
resistors.352 By 1944 this pattern changed. At that point, Allied victory seemed not only
likely, but imminent. Just as collaboration had been attractive to opportunists in 1940,
resistance now took on a cache to those with an eye towards the future. Collaboration, in
turn, reached an all time low in participation and popularity – public opinion had turned
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completely against Vichy and its policies. During 1944, the resistance movement was at
its most active and its most populous.
A separate cause for this, aside from the changing patterns of war outside France,
may have been that at this point the occupation again intensified. It had been in place
since June 1940 and by 1944 shortages were felt nationwide; no region or town was
immune any longer. It was also by far the most dangerous year to be in France, in
particular during the spring and summer.353 For the first time since 1940, German troops
were moving on a colossal scale. This time, however, it was not as the victorious
conquerors, but as soldiers actively at war, and they were thus keen to avoid major roads
and thoroughfares, which were more likely to attract Allied bombers. This is the period
during which the only major atrocities in the occupation occurred, the best example being
the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane in the Limousin on June 10, 1944, when 642 people
were killed. The intensifying occupation and the weakening of the Germans on other
fronts combined to inspire French resistance to escalate just as the occupation was
reaching its closing stages.
Some historians have argued that the black market was an act of resistance.
While participating in the black market certainly went against Vichy’s policies, there are
several problems with this claim.

Evidence confirms that though Vichy officially

condemned the black market, it also recognized the necessity of its existence. A law
promulgated in 1942, for example, intended to regulate the black market specifically
omitted any mention of using the market for personal needs.354 Many, if not all, Vichy
officials participated in it themselves. German soldiers were also key participants in the
353
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black market. The black market was simply the natural response to a forced, controlled
economy, without ideological undertones. Proof of this lies in the black markets that
sprang up even in those states not under occupation.355
Social Class
According to some sources, the occupation, and in particular the black market,
were responsible for an odd social inversion in France.356 Education, long held at a
premium in French culture took a backseat to more practical connections – farmers and
grocers, for example, had easier access to resources than the educated elite by virtue of
their work. However the educated elite were also those citizens most likely to keep
memoirs, thus “historians are particularly aware of their suffering.”357 Indeed, virtually
all of the primary sources available from the occupation period are written by members of
the upper or middle classes. Marie-Louise Osmont married a doctor from a wealthy
family and inherited the ancestral estate along with the local prestige attached to it. Henri
Drouot was a history professor at the University of Dijon. Louis Guilloux and Alfred
Fabre-Luce were both well-established writers.
Did the educated elite have a markedly different experience of occupation? Or
were they simply more accustomed to recording their thoughts? Did those with truly
horrific struggles not have the luxury of putting pen to paper to record their experiences?
Not that education guaranteed surviving the war unscathed – Drouot and Fabre-Luce
experienced firsthand the deprivation in France’s cities, while Osmont was obligated to
quarter soldiers belonging to a foreign power for over four years. It seems likely the
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preponderance of sources from this group reflects tendencies within that group, rather
than any great differentiation from France as a whole.
Any social inversion that did occur was limited. Money was the best tool for
survival during the occupation. The right amount of money made anything possibly
somehow, even when France was plagued by nationwide scarcity late in the war.358 In
this sense, the occupation had not changed anything. Those with money still had access
to goods if they were willing to pay a high price and those without it did not. Certainly
this aspect of the occupation shows a significant continuity, rather than change. Money
eased the pains of occupation, and lacking it augmented them considerably.
Socio-economic conditions had tangible effects on women’s experience of the
occupation. It dictated the way in which they interacted with German soldiers, and the
way in which the government responded to their interactions. “The reports of rape in
Paris came from working-class districts….both the French and German authorities seem
to have taken rape most seriously when bourgeois women were involved.”359
Working class women were more likely to have contact with soldiers by virtue of
their jobs – the Germans frequented cafés and hotels throughout France and it was often
the barmaids, waitresses, or cleaning ladies in these institutions who were reported to
have sexual relationships with German soldiers.360 Access and opportunity were essential
ingredients. These women were readily available and, because they were not of a high
social class, were considered legitimate targets. It would have been nearly impossible for
these working class women to avoid some interaction with German soldiers.
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Furthermore, they were often likely to be the children of unwed or single mothers
themselves.361 Many of these women could not help but see a relationship with a German
soldier as an opportunity – while the Germans were the dominant power in France it
offered several advantages. These ranged from specialized access to goods to an elevated
importance in society.
Unlike the romanticized image of cross cultural love blossoming in the small,
provincial town of Nevers portrayed in the 1959 film Hiroshima, Mon Amour,
relationships between French women and German men tended to flourish in large urban
areas that had high concentrations of German soldiers.362 This provided not only the
necessary opportunity, but also anonymity, which was extremely important for
protection, as the French public remained stolidly opposed to such liaisons.
Class differences also colored choices regarding collaboration and resistance.
One historian described the “typical” collaborator as an upper to middle-class, urban
male.363 Again, part of this stereotype was subject to opportunity. Urbanites would have
had more access to means of collaboration, whether simply through contact with German
soldiers or more nuanced paths. The documentary The Sorrow and the Pity by Marcel
Ophuls implies that the bourgeois were largely neutral, as they had the most to lose,
leaving those at the bottom and top of society as the foremost collaborators.364 This
somewhat contradictory picture leaves us with collaborators who had either the most to
gain or the most to offer.
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Historiography tends to generalize class as a determinant for collaboration or
resistance far more than was likely the case. In hindsight class-consciousness has been
introduced where perhaps it never existed. For example, because labor parties were
suppressed in Nazi Germany, it would therefore have supposedly been impossible for any
of France’s working class to enter into any kind of resistance, out of proletariat
solidarity.365 Collaboration, then, was allegedly restricted to capitalists, in particular
business leaders, and resistance was the realm of the working class, who purportedly saw
their cause as a cross-European crusade.366

Obviously this viewpoint is not only

anachronistic but seriously misleading. “Not all leading industrialists were collaborators,
any more than all workers were members of the Resistance.”367 Suggesting otherwise not
only generalizes what were undoubtedly personal and circumstantial decisions, but also
grossly overpopulates both the collaboration and resistance movements, neither of which
ever had any such overwhelming numbers.
Conclusion
It is significant, and intentional, that all the journals I have used as primary
sources are from four very different places. Paris, Dijon, St. Brieuc and Périers are all
important by virtue of their vantage point on the occupation, but none shared exactly the
same experience.

Together, they provide a nuanced picture of the occupation,

specifically as it occurred in Ile-de-France, Brittany, Normandy, and Burgundy, four of
the major provinces in the Occupied Zone. Additionally, although each belongs to the
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upper class, no source is quite like the other, and thus not only four distinct regions, but
four distinct visions of France are presented.
Once compiled, the picture that emerges shows the links between the material,
political and social situations that persisted under the occupation.

Where material

resources were limited, discontent was high, but those who stood to gain by the
occupation often did so. Take for example the black market and the role it played in the
rise of the countryside. While many paysans suffered through the occupation, others
were able to navigate the extralegal markets to offset their losses in the rising costs of
equipment with unprecedented revenues from desperate town and city dwellers.
The links between the city and the country also emerge as part of the image of
Occupied France. Many things bound them together, in particular economic and social
ties. While these ties differed from region to region, what was constant throughout were
the links and the lack of separation between the urban and rural experiences of
occupation.
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Conclusion
In many ways, the German occupation of France between 1940 and 1944 served
to reinforce trends that already existed. Social stratification came to the foreground as
the prime importance of money and connections was reemphasized in the heightened
competition for resources. Tensions between cities and the countryside – in place long
before the occupation, if largely dormant – were reignited as the supremacy of the city
was tested and strained by scarcity. Hostility towards outsiders and the unknown also
reemerged with new potency – the occupying German and the unknown Frenchman were
equally subject to this antagonism. Continuity persisted, even in the face of occupation.
In other ways, however, life in France changed drastically with the occupation.
Even while social stratification retained its former importance, the black market was
opening new avenues for social advancement for the enterprising farmer or merchant.
The black market served the additional purpose of establishing new links, both trade and
familial. These links built, and in some cases rebuilt, bonds between the city and country
at the same moment that these same bonds were coming under threat from scarcity and
competition.
Several factors that determined the experience of occupation can be identified:
geography, population density, agricultural traditions, social class, pre-war conditions,
and ingenuity.

These variables shaped the way the occupation appeared in different

places and to different people.
Geography played an important strategic role. Those Frenchmen living in the
Nord Pas de Calais were subjected to a total military occupation from the outset of the
war, due to their tactically important location close to the Belgian border and in the initial
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German line of assault. Compounding this was the industrial importance of the region,
which was home to a number of factories put to use towards the German war effort.
Southern provinces like the Limousin or the Auvergne, by contrast, had a substantially
different experience. The south of France was not integrated into the Occupied Zone
until November 1942, and even then the German presence was limited.368 Landlocked
regions in the economically dependent south simply held less importance for the
occupying Germans.
Population density could often transform what would otherwise be a strategically
unimportant area. France’s urban centers, whether landlocked or coastal trading hubs,
became the focus of the German occupation.

Each had its own German regional

administration, designed to correspond to the existing French administration.369 While
the center of the occupation was Paris, other cities like Tours, Bordeaux, Nantes and Lille
were all important centers, focuses of interaction between the occupier and the occupied
and conduits for resistance and collaboration.
Agricultural traditions often followed the lines of geography and were extremely
important to a region’s experience of the occupation. Monoculture, which in peacetime
would often make an area prosperous from the wine or olive oil trade, became a
hindrance under the occupation conditions. Virtually nonexistent foreign trade combined
with truncated domestic routes often limited regions to what they could produce
themselves, giving a decisive advantage to those accustomed to tending to diverse crops
and livestock. Living in a monocultural region was of course no death sentence –
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domestic trade was not so damaged that inter-regional trade ceased to function. It did,
however, put those areas, in particular their urban centers, at a pronounced disadvantage.
Marseilles, for example, suffered from greater deprivations than Paris in the north
because it lacked a proximate self-sufficient agricultural tradition.370
Social class and the advantages (or disadvantages) that came with it could easily
change the face of occupation, no matter where in France you were. Those who wanted
something first needed something to trade for it – according to Alfred Fabre-Luce, for
tobacco it was advisable to bring a chicken; when looking for cement, cheese.371 Wealth
brought availability, even for those goods scarce or nonexistent to others.372 Thus even
as the black market was providing new opportunities to France’s farmers or middlemen,
preexisting wealth still held its natural advantages and allowed those with it to live above
the daily scramblings and endemic dangers of the black market. Marie-Louise Osmont
provides an excellent illustration of this point, as her wealth allowed her to live and eat
comfortably for the majority of the occupation without once entering in the black market
herself.373 In this way, France’s pre-war social structure was reinforced.
What can be said of the character of the French, as judged by the occupation?
What emerged from Occupied France was neither widespread national heroism nor
cowardice, but rather a dogged insistence on carrying on in spite of events. Even if every
other factor was stacked against you– geography, regional agricultural traditions, social
class, etc – with the right mix of opportunity and ingenuity, the occupation could become
370
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not only livable but profitable.374 The majority of the French accepted that events beyond
their control had dictated their loser’s lot and set about not to change the world, but to see
themselves and their families through the occupation unscathed. While it may not seem
particularly heroic, this path does illustrate a national spirit of ingenuity and
perseverance.375

Out of this spirit, substitutes for missing staples were developed,

including saccharine for sugar and pedal-powered generators to create electricity at hair
salons and other businesses.376
One central generalization can be made about Occupied France: The urban
experience of occupation was harder than its rural counterpart. Rural areas had the
advantage of proximity to points of production, which generally enabled them to live
through an occupation less marked by scarcity, and even one that put them in a position
of economic power for the first time in generations. Actual, demonstrable changes were
also simply more present in urban areas – it was here where most of the German soldiers
in France were gathered, here where administrators were paired with their German
opposite numbers, where tensions ran the highest. France’s cities, in particular Paris,
were also the initial birthplace of both the collaboration and resistance movements.377
While these movements diversified geographically as the occupation progressed, their
impetus came from the opportunities available in large urban centers, unavailable in the
rest of France at the outset of the war.
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The overall image of Occupied France, then, is somewhat contradictory. Was it
markedly different than France under the Third Republic, or closely parallel? Certainly
several of the government officials transferred directly from the ailing Third Republic to
Vichy’s l’Etat Français.378 Even so, and in spite of certain significant continuities,
French society had changed. The spirit and the image of France were permanently
altered by defeat, by suffering, and most importantly by the questionable and haunting
legacy of occupation. One historian wrote that “the moral and psychic wounds were even
more tender than the material ones,” suggesting the depth of the damage to France’s
republican identity.379
The experience of civilians in Occupied France between 1940 and 1944 set the
course for the French nation to take for the subsequent several decades. It became a
source of national pride and later a source of national shame, and in both it shaped the
attitudes of contemporary French society towards their past and present. Today it is still
debated, as historians and laypeople alike search to find the middle ground that defined
occupation. What truly defined occupation, though, was not its ever-evolving legacy.
Rather it was the day-to-day experiences of French civilians who lived for four years
under German power and, as a nation, sought to find normalcy and stability in the midst
of defeat and occupation.
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